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CONTINUITY, PRECEDENT, AND CHOICE
OF LAW: A REFLECTIVE RESPONSE TO
PROFESSOR HILL
ROBERT A. SEDLERf
I. PROFESSOR HILL'S THESIS: CONTINUITY AND PRECEDENT IN CHOICE
OF LAW
In a long and distinguished career of legal scholarship, Pro-
fessor Alfred Hill has made very valuable contributions to numer-
ous areas of the law. Among the areas of law that have benefited
from Professor Hill's scholarship is the Conflict of Laws.' Pro-
fessor Hill was an early critic of the interest analysis approach to
choice of law, shortly after it was promulgated by Brainerd Currie.2
More recently, he has presented a thesis as to the significance of
continuity and precedent in choice of law.' He relates continuity
and precedent to what he calls the judicial function in resolving
choice of law questions. 4 As a part of this thesis, he maintains
that the traditional choice of law rules, when understood in terms
of continuity and precedent, may provide a valuable resource for
the courts today as they perform the judicial function of resolving
choice of law questions.5
Professor Hill attacks the modern "choice of law revolution"
for its seeming disregard of continuity and precedent. As he states:
The view has taken hold that traditional conceptions re-
garding the resolution of multistate controversies are fun-
damentally flawed, so that the traditional rules are bad
beyond repair. The consequence has been widespread ju-
t Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., 1956; J.D., 1959,
University of Pittsburgh.
I. See Tribute-Professor Alfred Hill, 91 COLuM. L. Rnv. 227 (1991) (listing
of Professor Hill's writings and a tribute by his Columbia colleagues).
2. Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Pro-
fessor Currie, 27 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 463 (1960) [hereinafter Reply].
3. This thesis is developed in Hill, The Judicial Function in Choice of Law,
85 COLum. L. Rnv. 1585 (1985) [hereinafter Judicial Function].
4. Id. at 1619-36.
5. Id.
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dicial rejection of those rules, root and branch, and the
substitution of ad hoc methods for the solution of choice
of law problems.6
According to Professor Hill, the traditional rules were the
outgrowth of centuries of development of patterns in the locali-
zation of the law governing multistate controversies. 7 These pat-
terns represented "varied responses to experience," and the
traditional rules reflect a "body of complex and sometimes variant
ideas, embodied in scholarly comment, judicial practice, and oc-
casional codes." ' This is why they add to the "richness of the
materials available for aid in resolving current problems." 9 Pro-
fessor Hill goes to great lengths to separate the traditional rules
that were applied in the United States under what has been called
the traditional approach to choice of law' ° from their conceptual
underpinning in the vested rights theory and their incorporation
into the First Restatement." He notes that the Restatement was
not the "fructification of the conflicts wisdom of the ages," but
instead was a "highly conceptualistic and rigid body of rules,
drafted under the influence of a theory of vested rights that
important conflicts scholars had long thought to be ludicrous.' ' 2
Professor Hill's thesis puts emphasis on "the judicial function
in the face of precedent.' ' 3 He says that in other areas of law,
courts rely on precedent to "furnish a rule of decision that is at
least presumptively dispositive of the case before the court.' ' 4 He
continues that a precedent should only be disregarded because it
turns out to have been unsound when formulated or is unresponsive
to current needs, and he submits that "such an approach to
precedent is no less appropriate in the case of choice of law. '"'5
A most interesting feature of Professor Hill's thesis is his effort
to demonstrate a linkage between the traditional rules and "rele-
vant governmental interests." Professor Hill is critical of the Currie
6. Id. at 1585-86.
7. Id. at 1587.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See generally, R. SEDLER, ACROSS STATE LINEs 29-33 (1989) [hereinafter
ACROSS STATE LlnEs] (discussion of the traditional approach).
11. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1587-634.






version of interest analysis because of Currie's insistence that choice
of law problems "cannot be solved by general principles or rules
designed to that end" and that it would be detrimental "to resort
to a body of law that purported to prescribe generalized solutions
for choice of law problems."'1 6 At the same time, Professor Hill
makes it clear that he supports the proposition that choice of law
decisions should be based on a consideration of "relevant govern-
mental interests" and that the forum should "decide a multistate
dispute in accordance with its own interests-provided that those
interests are appraised realistically." '7
Professor Hill maintains that a consideration of "relevant
governmental interests" has always been a part of choice of law
analysis. He traces this consideration of governmental interests to
the "earliest formulators of the territoriality principle," such as
Huber, who, he contends, believed the basic objective of the
conflict of laws was to advance the governmental interests of the
forum.'" Professor Hill notes that Huber's "Three Canons" were
essentially rationalizations of the conflicts practice followed in the
Netherlands of his day. 19 Likewise, Story's comity theory, which
drew its inspiration from Huber, "had no place for foreign law
except on the basis of mutual convenience. "20
Professor Hill sees the traditional territorially-based rules as
representing "in the main, rational responses to the felt necessities
of the times in which they were produced.''21 Professor Hill
discovers a "universal impulse" to achieve localization from the
onset of the development of conflicts law and asserts that the rules
that emerged were premised on the implementation of the govern-
mental interests of the involved states.Y In this vein, Hill concludes
that a court deciding a conflicts case today should proceed on the
assumption that the traditional rules implement governmental in-
terests and have some utility in resolving the choice of law question
presented to the court. Thus, it is not necessary or desirable for
a court to "decide. choice of law problems afresh, with the resulting
outcomes determined on an essentially ad hoc basis.''23
16. Id. at 1592.
17. Id. at 1588-89.
18. Reply, supra note 2, at 482.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 483.
22. Id.
23. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1600.
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Therefore, Professor Hill is advocating an approach to choice
of law that is based on continuity and precedent, with the resulting
presumptive application in a given case of the traditional choice
of law rules. The presumptive application of the traditional rule
can be rebutted in a given case by showing that the application
of the rule in that case will produce a functionally unsound result.
If that showing cannot be made, Hill says that the traditional rule
should be applied and should be dispositive of the choice of law
issue presented. 24
Professor Hill demonstrates this thesis by a consideration of
choice of law in the areas of torts, contracts, and property and
succession. 25 In the area of torts, he notes that the lex loci delicti
rule has been dominant outside of the United States and within
the United States as well until fairly recent times. Hill asserts that
"to say that this should count for nothing is to make a breathtaking
assertion about the lack of good sense of jurists in most places
and times other than the United States today. ' 26 He justifies the
rule on the grounds that: (1) The alleged tortfeasor is held to the
behavioral standards of the place where the tortfeasor acted or
where the conduct foreseeably took effect; (2) the victim's rights
are determined by the law of the same place, just as the burden
of that law would be imposed on the victim for the victim's own
conduct there; and (3) under the rule, out-of-state actors or victims
are treated no differently than local actors or victims. 27 Hill criti-
cizes the operation of the lex loci delicti rule under the traditional
approach because it is unnecessarily applied to a wide range of
collateral issues, such as guest-host immunity.28 He concludes as
follows:
In sum, the rule of lex loci delicti goes far to advance
sensible policies of fairness and accommodation in a com-
munity of states. It is unnecessary and wasteful to uproot
lex loci delicti in its entirety, in order to deal with the
excesses resulting from uncritical application of the rule to
all the collateral issues arising in torts litigation. 29
24. Id. at 1647.
25. Id. at 1623-30.
26. Id. at 1623.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1623-24.
29. Id. at 1625.
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In the contracts area, Professor Hill asserts that "in England
and in most of the rest of the world, the basic conflicts principle
applicable to contracts" is that of party autonomy.3 0 Under this
principle, a court would recognize the parties' express choice of
law and, in the absence of an express choice, would apply the law
impliedly intended by the parties.3' Hill instructs that purported
contracts choice of law rules, such as the lex loci contractus or
the lex loci solutionis were developed as presumptions for deter-
mining implied intent when the parties had not made an express
choice of law.32 Similarly, this was the early practice in the United
States as well, so that the exclusion of party autonomy in favor
of the lex loci contractus rule in the First Restatement represented
a break with continuity and precedent. 3
Professor Hill justifies party autonomy in contracts cases on
the same basis as its many other proponents: (1) it enables the
parties to achieve predictability in an area where predictability is
very important; and (2) the "necessary accommodation" between
the interests of "trading states" will be achieved most fairly and
effectively by accepting the terms adopted by the parties. 4 Pro-
fessor Hill claims that the only exception to the principle of party
autonomy should be for the "overriding character of laws designed
to implement special regulatory or protective policies. ' 35 Where
the parties have not made an express choice of law, as frequently
happens, these objectives can be achieved by determining what
"law the parties would have intended had they thought about the
matter.' '36
Hill says that the "choice of law revolution" has essentially
been limited to torts and contracts and that in the property and
succession area, "the occasional decisions that surface typically
follow traditional practice." 7 I agree with this observation and
further maintain that, with the exception of the situs rule to
30. Id. at 1625-26. This is the approach that is referred to as the "proper
law of the contract" by the English courts and is essentially the approach taken by
the Restatement Second. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text for a discussion
of this approach.
31. Id. at 1626.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1620.
34. Id. at 1626-27.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1628.
37. Id. at 1586.
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determine succession to land, the application of the traditional
rules will generally produce functionally sound results. 38
Professor Hill carefully explains how the application of the
law of the situs to determine the existence and incidents of property
interests in land and movable property reflects both the recognition
of the interest of the situs in regulating such matters and the
protection of the parties' reliance interests. 39 However, when it
comes to the traditional rule of "split succession,'"'4 Professor Hill
notes that "[iun much of the rest of the world, immovables (like
movables) pass in accordance with the domiciliary or national
law. ' ' 4' In any event, Hill emphasizes that in the area of property
and succession, the traditional rules will frequently operate to
implement "relevant governmental interests."
Professor Hill maintains that, among the various modern ap-
proaches to choice of law, only the Restatement Second's approach
can provide a helpful formulation for a court that is "persuaded
that consideration of precedent is a useful starting point in dealing
with choice of law issues. ' 42 He reiterates that in areas other than
torts and contracts, the traditional rules continue to operate, and
that these rules are incorporated into the Restatement Second,
subject to the possibility of alternative solutions in a particular
case. 43 This approach follows Professor Hill's view that the tra-
ditional rules should be presumptively applicable, but that they
can be set aside where appropriate in the particular case."
In the contracts area, Professor Hill finds that the Restatement
Second is generally supportive of the party autonomy rule that he
38. Relatively few cases involving choice of law in property matters
actually arise in practice and in comparison with other areas of law, choice
of law is considered to be fairly well-settled in this area. The courts
generally follow the rules of the traditional approach, and for the most
part the application of these rules in the property area produces functionally
sound results in practice.
AcRoss STATE LiNs, supra note 10, at 85.
39. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1628-30.
40. The traditional rule of split succession is succession to movable property
determined by the law of the decedent's last domicile, while succession to land is
determined by the law of the situs.
41. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1629 (citing M. WOLFF, PRrVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1950) at 567-68). In the subsequent discussion, I will
work under the assumption that Hill favors a rule under which succession to land,
as well as to movables, would presumptively be determined by the law of the
domicile.
42. Id. at 1636.
43. Id. at 1634.
44. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
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favors.45 Most importantly, the Restatement Second calls for rec-
ognition of the parties' express choice of law in all but exceptional
cases. 46 While Professor Hill believes that the use of the most
significant relationship concept to govern choice of law where the
parties have not made an effective choice is somewhat too gener-
alized, he is pleased with the Restatement Second's use of particular
rules grounded in precedent to govern specific types of contracts. 47
Hill believes that application of factors listed by the Restatement
Second to determine the state of the most significant relationship
will often lead to the same result that would follow if the court
were to apply the law the parties would have intended to apply if
they had thought about the matter.48
In the torts area, Professor Hill also approves of the Restate-
ment Second's provisions that make the law of the place of injury
presumptively applicable on damages questions and the "special
provisions, founded on precedent" for some specific torts, such
as defamation and invasion of privacy. 49 He asserts that the
Restatement Second's issue-by-issue approach is especially useful
in the torts area because it allows some issues, such as family
immunity, to be decided by a state's law other than the state of
injury, "thereby eliminating much of the difficulty occasioned by
the excessively broad categorization of the First Restatement. ' 50
It is important to note that Professor Hill is not advocating
an approach to choice of law based on "narrow, policy-based
rules," as has been advocated by his colleagues, Professor Reese5
and Professor Rosenberg 5 2 and seemingly adopted by the New
York Court of Appeals.53 As I have discussed more fully else-
where 5 4 under a "rules approach,'"-whether the broad, state-
45. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1634-36.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1634. An example would be the rule that, in the case of a contract
for hire, surety, or casualty insurance, the state of the most significant relationship
is presumptively the principal location of the insured risk.
48. Id. at 1635.
49. Id. at 1636.
50. Id.
51. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CoRNa. L. R-v. 315
(1972).
52. Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson, 67 COLU~M. L. Ray. 459
(1967).
53. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972).
54. See Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An
Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. Ray. 181, 208-16 (1977) [hereinafter
1992] 1425
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selecting rules of the traditional approach, or narrow, policy-based
rules-the rule is formulated a priori, and then applied to the
facts of a particular case. The case must be brought within the
rule, and no consideration is given to whether the application of
the rule in the instant case will produce a functionally sound result.
As Professor Reese has put it: "A choice of law rule that works
well in the great majority of situations should be applied even in
a case where it might not reach ideal results. Good rules, like
other advantages, have their price." 5 The approach advocated by
Professor Hill is not a "rules approach" in this sense. Rather, it
is a "judicial function" approach under which the focus is on
precedent and the traditional rules that have emerged from the
precedents of the decided cases. These rules are only presumptively
applicable to resolve the choice of law issue presented in a partic-
ular case and will not be applied where their application would
produce a functionally unsound result in that case.
II. A REFLECTIVE RESPONSE: JUDICIAL METHOD AND THE POLICY-
CENTERED CONFLICT OF LAWS
A. The Function of a Court in a Conflicts Case
Unlike Professor Hill, I am a strong proponent of Currie's
version of interest analysis. I maintain that interest analysis is the
preferred approach to choice of law because it provides functionally
sound and fair solutions to the choice of law issues arising in
actual cases. Interest analysis simplifies the choice of law process
by focusing on what the courts consider to be the most rational
consideration in making choice of law decisions: the policies re-
flected in a state's rule of substantive law and a state's interest in
Governmental Interest Approach]; Sedler, Interstate Accidents and the Unprovided
for Case: Reflections on Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HOFsTRA L. Rnv. 125, 130-37
(1973).
55. Reese, supra note 51, at 334. As he elaborated:
More specifically, the fact that a choice of law rule which has stood the
test of experience would lead on some rare occasion to the application of
the lav of a state which is not that of greatest concern, or would result
in the disregard of other multistate or local law policies, is not an adequate
reason why the rule should not be applied on that occasion. Perfection is
not for this world. The advantages which good rules bring are worth the
price of an occasional doubtful result.
Id. at 322 (footnote omitted).
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applying its law to implement those policies in the particular case. 56
Furthermore, I have demonstrated that, in practice, all the courts
that have abandoned the traditional approach to choice of law
generally employ interest analysis regardless of which "modern"
approach to choice of law they are purportedly following. 57
At the same time, I fully agree with Professor Hill in regard
to the nature of the judicial function in conflicts cases and the
importance of precedent in resolving the choice of law issues. I
have always distinguished between the function of a court in a
conflicts case and the use of the interest analysis approach by the
court in performing that function. 8 I relate the function of a court
in a conflicts case to what I see to be the purpose of conflicts
law, which is to provide functionally sound and fair solutions for
those relatively few cases that arise in practice in which a court
has to make a choice of law decision.5 9 Therefore, the court's
focus should be on the precise choice of law issue presented for
decision, and its objective should be to resolve that issue in such
a way that will produce a functionally sound and fair result.
Some years ago, I analyzed the choice of law process in terms
of judicial method and the policy-centered conflict of laws.6° In
accordance with the common law tradition, courts should apply
56. See generally Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict
of Laws: A Response to the 'New Critics,' 34 MERcER L. Rnv. 593 (1983) [hereinafter
New Critics]; Sedler, Professor Juenger's Challenge to the Interest Analysis Approach
to Choice-of-Law: An Appreciation and a Response, 23 U.C. DAviS L. REv. 865
(1990).
57. By this I mean that the results the courts reach in practice are generally
consistent with the results that would be reached under the interest analysis approach,
as developed by Currie and refined by his followers. See New Critics, supra note
56, at 635-43; Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 54, at 190-220 (discussion
of the application of the interest analysis approach in practice).
58. However, it is also my submission that interest analysis is the preferred
approach to choice of law because it is the approach that best enables a court to
perform the judicial function in a conflicts case.
59. For a discussion of why relatively few conflicts cases arise in practice, see
New Critics, supra note 56, at 597-98.
60. Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: Judicial Method and the Policy-
Centered Conflict of Laws, 56 Ky. L.J. 27 (1967) [hereinafter Judicial Method].
Other writings developing this analysis include: Sedler, Characterization, Identifica-
tion of the Problem Area, and the Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws: An Exercise
in Judicial Method, 2 Rur.-CAm. L.J. 8 (1970); Sedler, Judicial Method is "Alive
and Well": The Kentucky Approach to Choice of Law in Interstate Automobile
Accidents, 61 Ky. L.J. 378 (1973); Sedler, Choice of Law in Michigan: Judicial
Method and the Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws, 29 WAYNE L. Rnv. 1193 (1983)
[hereinafter Choice of Law in Michigan].
1992]
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judicial method to the resolution of conflicts problems, as they
apply it to other areas of law. 6' Professor Hill also makes this
point.62 Under judicial method, a court should render the choice
of law decision with reference to the fact-law pattern presented in
the particular case. The decision in that case would serve as a
precedent for decisions in other cases, and the decision's rationale
would serve as a guide to the resolution of future cases presenting
different fact-law patterns. In time, depending on the number and
kinds of cases that arose in each state, a body of conflicts law
would emerge through the normal workings of binding precedent
and stare decisis. 63
Furthermore, the criteria for the choice of law decision should
be based upon considerations of policy and fairness to the parties.
The rationale here is that the criteria for the choice of law
decision-the decision to displace the forum's own law and to
look to the law of another state, in whole or in part, for the rule
of decision in the case-should relate to the justification for such
displacement. Under the "criteria-justification" rationale, the for-
um's law should be displaced in a particular case only when policy
considerations, such as recognition of the legitimate interest of
another state in having its law applied, 4 or a concern for fairness,
such as protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties, dictate
the displacement of the forum's law in favor of another state's
law. In the absence of such considerations, the law of the forum
should apply, just as it would in a domestic case.
Under judicial method and the policy-centered conflict of laws,
the choice of law process operates in accordance with the following
premises: (1) the basic law is the law of the forum, which will be
applied in the absence of valid reasons for its displacement; 65 (2)
61. See Judicial Method, supra note 60, at 42-45, 57-58.
62. See supra notes 3-16 and accompanying text.
63. Judicial Method, supra note 60, at 82-87.
64. An example of such a situation, using the interest analysis approach, is
the "false conflict" brought in the disinterested state. Since the forum does not
have a real interest in applying its own law to implement the policy reflected in
that law, while the other involved state does, the forum should apply the law of
the only interested state. In practice, this is the most common situation where the
forum displaces its own law. See Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 54,
at 186-87, 222-27. Professor Hill approves of Currie's interest analysis approach to
the extent that it identifies the false conflict and calls for the application of the law
of the only interested state. See Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1592.
65. As to the reasons why the law of the forum is the basic law, see B.
CURREE, SELECTED ESSAYS iN THE CoNFUcr oF LAWS 75-76 (1963); Judicial Method,
supra note 60, at 87-95.
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the choice of law decision will be made with reference to the fact-
law pattern presented in the particular case; and (3) the choice of
law decision will be based on considerations of policy and fairness
to the parties.
B. Judicial Method in Practice: The Michigan Experience
The operation of judicial method and the policy-centered con-
flict of laws is illustrated by the practice of the Michigan Supreme
Court in conflicts torts cases. That court resolves conflicts torts
cases under a lex fori approach, as set forth in Olmstead v.
Anderson.6 6 This approach makes use of interest analysis, but only
in the context of determining whether Michigan law, as the law
of the forum, should be displaced in the circumstances of the
particular case. There are three elements to Michigan's lex fori
approach. First, the basic law is the law of the forum and the
question in a conflicts case is whether the case "presents a situation
in which reason requires that foreign law supersede the law of this
state.''67 Second the question of displacement of Michigan law is
determined by the use of interest analysis. The court considers the
policies reflected in the laws of the involved states and the interest
of each state, in light of those policies, in having its law applied
on the point in issue in the particular case. Third, when the state
whose law is sought to be applied in preference to Michigan law
has no interest in applying its law to implement the policies
reflected in that law, the choice of law inquiry proceeds no further,
and Michigan law applies as the law of the forum.
The development and application of Michigan's lex fori ap-
proach demonstrates how precedent can work in choice of law, as
it does in other areas. The development of the lex fori approach
began with Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental,68 decided in 1982, which
presented the familiar fact-law pattern of two Michigan parties
involved in an accident in another state where law would deny or
limit recovery, while the law of Michigan would not. In that case,
the Michigan Supreme Court abandoned the lex loci delicti rule,
but it limited its decision to the facts and did not adopt any of
the "modern" approaches to choice of law.6 9
In Olmstead v. Anderson, decided five years later, a different
fact-law pattern was presented. A Minnesota victim was involved
66. 428 Mich. 1, 400 N.W.2d 292 (1987).
67. Id. at 24, 400 N.W.2d at 302.
68. 413 Mich. 406, 320 N.W.2d 843 (1982).
69. See Choice of Law in Michigan, supra note 60, at 1201-10.
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in a fatal accident with a Michigan defendant in Wisconsin.
Wisconsin law limited damages recoverable for wrongful death
while neither Michigan law nor Minnesota law limited damages.70
In the context of resolving the choice of law issue, the Michigan
Supreme Court built on the Sexton precedent and formulated the
specific lex fori approach. Chief Justice Riley, writing for the
court, found several guides from the Sexton holding. First, the
court in Sexton had clearly abandoned the lex loci delicti rule'.7
Second, in Sexton, the court did not adopt a particular choice of
law methodology, which the court in Olmstead saw as leading to
the conclusion that the choice of law decision should be made
with reference to the fact-law pattern of the particular case. 72
Third, since the basis of the decision in Sexton was that there was
no rational reason to displace Michigan law in favor of the law
of the state where the accident occurred, 73 this would be the
criterion to determine whether Michigan law should be displaced
in any case.
Hence [in Sexton], there was no rational justification for
displacing the law of the forum. That same reasoning may
be applied to tort cases presenting somewhat different
factual scenarios. The question to be resolved is whether
... reason requires that foreign law supersede the law of
[the forum] .74
70. Olmstead, 428 Mich. at 3-7, 400 N.W.2d at 293-94.
71. "The reputed benefits of the lex loci delicti were no longer tenable, and
the precedents for applying the doctrine were either overruled or substantially
weakened." Id. at 23, 400 N.W.2d at 302.
72. There were separate opinions in Sexton, but Chief Justice Riley noted that
none of them adopted any specific methodology. She noted that the plurality opinion
by then-Chief Justice Williams acknowledged this point by saying that the holding
was reached in the "normal common-law tradition" and that under the concurring
opinion of Justice Kavanagh, "a case would be examined to determine whether the
foreign elements are so substantial as to override a presumption that forum law
applies." Thus, she concluded that under Sexton, "each case must be evaluated on
the circumstances presented." Id. at 23-24, 400 N.W.2d at 302. See also Choice of
Law in Michigan, supra note 60, at 1208.
73. Since both parties were Michigan residents, the state of injury had no
interest in applying its defendant-protecting law to protect a Michigan defendant
from liability to a Michigan plaintiff. Olmstead, 428 Mich. at 23-24, 400 N.W.2d
at 302. The fact-law pattern of two parties from a liability state being involved in
an accident in a non-liability state presents the classic "false conflict" and ever since
the seminal case of Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963),
has been the impetus for the abandonment of the lex loci delicti rule.
74. 428 Mich. at 24, 400 N.W.2d at 302.
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By using these guides from the Sexton precedent, the court was
able to formulate the specific lex fori approach to choice of law
in Michigan.
In applying that approach to the fact-law pattern presented in
Olmstead, the court likewise looked to its disposition of the choice
of law issue in Sexton. 71 In Olmstead, two of the facts were the
same as in Sexton: The defendant was from Michigan, where
recovery for wrongful death was not limited, and the accident
occurred in Wisconsin, where recovery was limited. The third fact,
the residence of the victim, was different. The victim in Olmstead
was from Minnesota, while the victim in Sexton was from Michi-
gan. 76 However, this difference did not justify the displacement of
Michigan law in Olmstead, since the defendant was from Michigan,
and Wisconsin had no interest in limiting the liability of the
Michigan defendant. As the court stated:
In this case, plaintiff is not a Michigan resident. However,
that fact does not affect the conclusion reached in Sexton
that the chief conceptual underpinnings of lex loci delicti-
certainty and predictability-are no longer viable. The Court
arrived at that conclusion without reference to the parties'
citizenship. Therefore, to apply lex loci delicti in this case
would advance those rationales no more than it would have
in Sexton. 7
Since Wisconsin had no interest in applying its defendant-
protecting law for the benefit of a Michigan defendant, no justi-
fication existed for displacing Michigan law. Thus, Michigan law
applied as the law of the forum. 78
75. Id. at 23-30, 400 N.W.2d at 302-05.
76. Id. at 24-26, 400 N.W.2d at 302-03.
77. Id. at 25, 400 N.W.2d at 303.
78. As the court concluded:
In sum, this case involves a suit brought by a party not a citizen of
Michigan, against a Michigan resident, arising out of an accident occurring
in a state in which neither party resided. The states in which both plaintiff
and defendant were citizens allow for unlimited recovery in wrongful death
actions, but the state of the accident does not. Applying the lex loci delicti
will not advance the conceptual rationales underlying the doctrine. Fur-
thermore, no unfairness would result to the parties in applying Michigan
law. Finally, since no citizen of Wisconsin is involved in the action, it has
no interest in seeing its law applied. In light of the above, there is no
rational reason to displace Michigan law.
Id. at 30-31, 400 N.W.2d at 305.
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With regard to the use of a case as precedent, the rationale of
the decision is important. The rationale serves as the basis for the
application of the precedent in other cases. In Olmstead, the
rationale of the decision also relates to the specific approach to
choice of law that was adopted in the case. That specific approach
is the lex fori approach, not interest analysis. Under the lex fori
approach, the focus is on whether there is a rational reason to
displace Michigan law in favor of the law of another state in the
particular case. Interest analysis is employed only to determine
whether the state whose law is sought to be applied in preference
to Michigan law has an interest in applying its law in order to
implement the policy reflected in that law. If the state does not
have such an interest, the choice of law inquiry proceeds no further
and Michigan law applies as the law of the forum. Only where
the other state does have such an interest does the choice of law
inquiry continue to determine whether Michigan has an interest in
applying its law as well.79
If the Michigan Supreme Court were following the interest
analysis approach, Olmstead would be identical to Sexton. Both
cases presented the false conflict: both the plaintiff and defendant
were from recovery states, albeit different recovery states, and the
accident occurred in a non-recovery state. The plaintiff's home
state had a real interest in applying its law allowing recovery. The
law of the defendant's home state did not protect the defendant,
and the state of injury had no interest in applying its law to
protect the out-of-state defendant. Thus, under interest analysis,
in a case presenting the fact-law pattern of Olmstead, Minnesota
law would apply as the law of the only interested state. 80
79. In Olmstead, the court emphasized that where the other involved state
did not have such an interest, any consideration of Michigan's interest was irrelevant
and unnecessary. As the court stated:
Finding as we do that applying the lex loci delicti will not promote the
reputed advantages of that doctrine and that Wisconsin has no interest in
seeing its law applied, we see no rational reason to displace Michigan law
in this case. Since there is no reason to apply Wisconsin law, it is, therefore,
unnecessary to undertake an analysis of the interests of Michigan....
Such an analysis is unnecessary in this case. However, in another case in
which the state of injury does have an interest in having its law applied,
such an analysis might be necessary and proper.
Id. at 29-30, 400 N.W.2d at 305.




Under Michigan's lex fori approach, however, the primary
basis for the choice of law decision is not a consideration of the
policies and interests of the involved states, but rather the existence
of a rational reason to displace Michigan law as the law of the
forum. The policy and interest of the other involved state is
reviewed to the extent that it bears on the question of a rational
reason for the displacement of Michigan law. If that state does
not have an interest in applying its law to implement the policy
reflected in that law, the choice of law inquiry proceeds no further
and Michigan law applies as the law of the forum. Where, as in
Olmstead, the defendant is a Michigan resident, neither the plain-
tiff's home state nor the state where the accident occurred would
have an interest in limiting the defendant's liability for wrongful
death. Thus, it is irrelevant under Michigan's lex fori approach
whether or not the plaintiff's home state would limit the defen-
dant's liability for wrongful death. Whenever a Michigan defendant
is involved and Michigan law does not limit liability for wrongful
death or otherwise protect the Michigan defendant, the defendant
will be held fully liable under Michigan law, which applies as the
law of the forum.
The latter point was dispositive in Mahne v. Ford Motor Co.8'
In Mahne, the fact-law pattern differed from that in Olmstead
because the accident occurred in the victim's home state. Mahne
was a products liability case, concerning a fuel tank design defect
in a 1967 Ford Mustang. The fuel tank exploded upon impact in
Florida in 1985, causing horrible burn injuries to the Florida
victim. 82 At that time, Florida had a statute of repose, which
barred all product actions twelve years after the date of manufac-
ture. Michigan does not have a statute of repose. Under Michigan
law, the manufacturer is liable if negligence in the design of the
vehicle could be shown, regardless of how long the product had
been in use. 83 Ford, a Michigan manufacturer, does not conduct
any manufacturing activities in Florida, and all facts relating to
the design, testing, and manufacture of the 1967 Ford Mustang
took place at Ford's headquarters in Michigan. 4 Since Ford did
not conduct any manufacturing activities in Florida, Florida had
no interest in applying its manufacturer-protecting policy in this
81. See Mahne v. Ford Motor Co., 900 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 349 (1990).
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case.85 Therefore, as the Sixth Circuit held, under Olmstead, the
choice of law inquiry would proceed no further, and Michigan
law applied as the law of the forum.8 6
If Michigan had adopted the interest analysis approach in
Olmstead instead of the lexfori approach, Mahne might have been
more difficult to decide. Unlike Olmstead, which, in terms of
interest analysis, presented the false conflict, Mahne presented the
unprovided-for case. Florida would have no interest in applying
its manufacturer-protecting policy for the benefit of a Michigan
manufacturer which did not conduct any manufacturing activities
in Florida. Likewise, since Michigan products liability law imposes
liability only on the basis of negligence and does not permit
recovery of punitive damages, 87 it is difficult to characterize that
law as reflecting an admonitory or regulatory policy that Michigan
would be interested- in applying to the activity of a Michigan
manufacturer in Michigan. Nor would Michigan have any interest
in applying the compensatory policy reflected in its products lia-
bility law for the benefit of a Florida victim injured in Florida.
Under Michigan's lexfori approach, however, no inquiry exists
as to Michigan's interest once a determination is made that the
other involved state has no interest in applying its law to implement
the policy reflected in that law. Once that determination is made,
Michigan law applies as the law of the forum. Under Michigan's
lex fori approach the unprovided-for case in effect is resolved by
the application of Michigan law as the law of the forum.
The litigation arising out of the Northwest Airlines Flight 255
crash at Detroit Metropolitan Airport in August, 1987 created two
choice of law issues presenting different fact-law patterns from
those presented in Sexton, Olmstead, and Mahne. 8 These choice
of law issues involved the law applicable to the recovery of punitive
damages against Northwest Airlines and against McDonnell-Doug-
las, the manufacturer of the D-C 9 aircraft involved in the fatal
crash.89 McDonnell-Douglas designed and manufactured the air-
85. Id.
86. As the Sixth Circuit stated: "Since Florida has no interest in having its
statute of repose applied, Michigan law applies without regard to the nature or
quality of Michigan's interests," and "[slince there is no rational reason to displace
Michigan law, the presumptive lex fori rule directs that Michigan law governs the
case." Id. at 88-89. (The author acted of counsel to the lawyers for the plaintiff in
Mahne and briefed and argued the choice of law issue before the Sixth Circuit).
87. See Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 421 Mich. 670, 365 N.W.2d 176 (1984).
88. In re Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport, 750 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Mich.
1989).
89. Id. at 793-96.
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craft in California. 90 California products liability law is based on
strict liability and allows the recovery of punitive damages. 9' Mi-
chigan products liability law is based on negligence, and punitive
damages are not recoverable.92 With respect to the claims of
Michigan victims against McDonnell-Douglas, the federal court,
sitting in diversity, held that under Michigan's lex fori approach,
Michigan law would be displaced in favor of California law on
this issue.93 The court reasoned that California products liability
law reflected a "producer regulatory policy," so that California
had a real interest in applying this policy to all design and
manufacturing activity that took place in California. 94 Under the
lexfori approach, this meant that the choice of law inquiry would
continue and that it would be necessary to consider Michigan's
interest. Michigan had no interest in applying the manufacturer-
protecting policy reflected in its law95 for the benefit of a California
manufacturer that did not conduct any manufacturing activities in
Michigan and that designed the allegedly defective aircraft in
California. 96 Since California had a real interest in applying its
law to implement the policy reflected in that law and Michigan
did not under Michigan's lex fori approach, "reason require[s]
that foreign law supersede the law of this state." The court,
therefore, held that California law applied on the issue of recovery
of punitive damages against McDonnell-Douglas. 97
90. Id.
91. Id. at 802.
92. Id. at 801, 805.
93. Id. at 802.
94. Id. at 801.
95. Strictly speaking, this refers to the manufacturer-protecting policy as it
appeared with respect to the issue on which Michigan and California law differed.
Depending on the content of the law of the other state, Michigan products liability
law attempts to strike an even balance between the interests of victims and the
interests of manufacturers. Therefore, Michigan law will be manufacturer-protecting
on one issue and victim-protecting on another issue. See generally Prentis v. Yale
Mfg. Co., 421 Mich. 670, 365 N.W.2d 176 (1984). It was manufacturer-protecting
in the Flight 255 case, since Michigan follows a negligence standard and does not
allow recovery of punitive damages. It was victim-protecting in Mahne, since it does
not include a statute of repose and allows recovery for negligence no matter how
long the product has been in operation.
96. 750 F. Supp. at 801.
97. Id. at 802, 811-12. In terms of interest analysis, this case presents the
false conflict situation, with Michigan as the "disinterested state." It is only in this
situation-in conflicts torts cases-that Michigan substantive law can be displaced
under Michigan's lex fori approach.
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Another issue involved punitive damages claims against North-
west Airlines. 98 Northwest Airlines principal place of business is
Minnesota. Minnesota law allows recovery of punitive damages in
wrongful death cases. However, Detroit Metropolitan Airport is
one of Northwest's "hubs," and over sixty per cent of the flights
originating from Detroit Metropolitan are Northwest flights, in-
cluding the fatal flight 255. Michigan law, as stated above, does
not allow recovery of punitive damages in any case. The court
found that Minnesota law allowing recovery of punitive damages
as applied to corporations with their principal place of business in
Minnesota, reflected a "corporate regulatory policy," which Min-
nesota wanted to impose on such corporations.99 But the court
also found that Michigan had a real interest in applying its law,
disallowing punitive damages, to protect Northwest Airlines from
such liability in an accident arising out of Northwest's business
activity in Michigan.1 0° In this true conflict situation, the court
concluded that "there is no rational reason to abandon Michigan
law." Therefore, Michigan law applied as the law of the forum. 0'
Under Michigan's lexfori approach to choice of law, Michigan
law applies in all conflicts torts cases brought in Michigan courts
except in the false conflict situation where Michigan is the "dis-
interested state." This false conflict is the only situation where
reason would require a foreign law to supersede the law of the
forum because the foreign state has a real interest in applying its
law to implement the underlying policy reflected in that law, while
Michigan has no such interest. In Michigan, we have seen how a
body of conflicts law can emerge in a particular state through the
normal workings of binding precedent and stare decisis. This
process has resulted in a specific approach to choice of law under
which the law of the forum applies unless "reason requires that
foreign law supersede the law of this state."' 0 2
This operation of judicial method and the policy-centered
conflict of laws in Michigan, with the resulting lex fori approach
to choice of law, contradicts Professor Hill's assertion that choice
98. Id. at 804-12.
99. Id. at 806-07.
100. Id. at 807.
101. Id. at 807-08. Also see the discussion of the application of Michigan law
in the true conflict situation in Choice of Law in Michigan, supra note 60, at 1212-
14.
102. 750 F. Supp. at 802, 811-12.
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of law decisions are currently made on an "essentially ad hoc
basis." 0 3 To the contrary, the Michigan experience indicates that
courts can perform the judicial function in the manner advocated
by Professor Hill and can use precedent to establish a body of
conflicts law for the state.
C. Judicial Method in Practice: "Rules of Choice of Law"
The performance of the judicial function by the courts in
conflicts cases today may also be demonstrated by the courts'
development of what I call "rules of choice of law." I have
demonstrated that in the torts area, at least, these "rules of choice
of law" have emerged from the practice of the courts in deciding
conflicts torts cases.' 4 I distinguish these "rules of choice of law"
from choice of law rules, such as those that were embodied in the
traditional approach. Choice of law rules are formulated a priori
and then applied to the facts of a particular case. Any "preceden-
tial effect" of a case where the court has simply applied a choice
of law rule is dubious, since the court's decision was neither made
independently of the rule nor with reference to the precise choice
of law issue presented in the particular case.
A "rule of choice of law," by contrast, emerges from the
decisions of courts in the actual cases appearing before them for
decision. Thus, it may be considered to be a "true precedent." I
should add, however, that these tort "rules of choice of law" are
based on the results of the decided case. They are not based on
the courts' explanations for their decisions or on the particular
choice of law approach purportedly applied.
"Rules of choice of law" can be developed from the courts'
decisions in actual cases because conflicts cases, particularly in the
torts area, tend to fall into certain fact-law patterns. My discussion
of Michigan's lex fori approach to choice of law briefly referred
to these fact-law patterns.105 In torts cases, the "fact" of the fact-
law pattern relates to the states where the parties reside, the state
where the harm is suffered, and if it differs, the state where the
act or omission causing the harm took place. The "law" relates
103. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1600.
104. Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules: Judicial
Method in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. REv. 975 (1977) [hereinafter Rules
of Choice of Law].
105. See supra notes 75-97 and accompanying text.
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to whether the law in question allows or denies recovery, whether
it reflects an admonitory and/or compensatory policy, and whether
it involves other considerations, such as those applicable to work-
er's compensation. From these fact-law patterns "rules of choice
of law" emerge. In some fact-law patterns, the results are fairly
uniform. In others, the courts are divided, but these divisions can
be stated in terms of majority and minority rules.' °0
In actual practice, the courts that have abandoned the tradi-
tional approach are applying judicial method to the resolution of
conflicts cases. These courts make the choice of law decision with
reference to the fact-law pattern presented in the particular case.
Thus, the decision in one case can be applied directly or analo-
gously to another case presenting the same or a similar fact-law
pattern. Likewise, in deciding cases and in developing "rules of
choice of law," the courts also set forth principles, as they do in
other areas of law. These principles can then guide the resolution
of future cases presenting different fact-law patterns.
Therefore, I strongly disagree with Professor Hill's assertion
that current choice of law decisions are being made on an "essen-
tially ad hoc basis." Professor Hill bases this assertion largely on
the application of Currie's interest analysis approach, on his crit-
icisms of the reasoning, and sometimes on the results of particular
choice of law decisions applying the "new learning." The results
of court decisions, however, indicate that judicial method is being
used in the resolution of conflicts cases. Thus, in practice precedent
operates in conflicts cases as it does in other areas of the law.
III. A REFLECTIvE RESPONSE CONTINUED: PROFESSOR HILL'S
TRADITIONAL RULES
My submission that the courts are in fact following judicial
method and relying on precedent in conflicts cases does not answer
the continuity part of Professor Hill's thesis. Professor Hill con-
tends that the traditional rules were the outgrowth of centuries of
development of patterns in the localization of the law governing
multistate controversies. 0 7 Further, he contends that a considera-
tion of relevant governmental interests has always been a part of
choice of law analysis and that the implementation of these interests
provided the basis for traditional rules. 08 He argues, therefore,
106. For a discussion of the tort "rules of choice of law," see Rules of Choice
of Law, supra note 104, at 1032-41. See also AcRoss STATE LINHS, supra note 10,
at 47-68 (Chapter 4).
107. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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that the traditional rules should be presumptively applicable to
resolve the conflicts issues that arise today and should be followed
except where the application of the rule would produce a func-
tionally unsound result. °9
In responding to Professor Hill's argument, I find it necessary
to differentiate among the traditional rules that he discusses. I
believe that some traditional rules, particularly in the property and
succession area, will produce functionally sound results in most of
their applications. Therefore, some traditional rules may be pre-
sumptively applicable today. Other rules, however, will not produce
functionally sound results at all and should have no place in
modern choice of law analysis.
A. The Lex Loci Delicti Rule in Torts Cases
My strongest disagreement with Professor Hill is over his claim
that the lex loci delicti rule has utility and should be presumptively
applicable in conflicts torts cases." 0 I think that the lex loci delicti
rule has no utility at all. Its purported application, even presump-
tively, distorts the analysis of the real interests of the involved
states and may lead to functionally unsound results.
As discussed previously, Professor Hill justifies the lex loci
delicti rule on the grounds that (1) the alleged tortfeasor is held
to the behavioral standards of the place where the tortfeasor acted
or where the conduct foreseeably took effect; (2) the victim's rights
are determined by the law of the same place, just as the burden
of that law would be imposed on the victim for the victim's own
conduct there; and (3) out-of-state actors or victims are treated no
differently than local actors or victims."' Professor Hill argues
that the rule "goes far to advance sensible policies of fairness and
accommodation in a community of states."" 2
None of these justifications, however, goes to advancing the
interests of involved states in having their laws applied to imple-
ment the policies reflected in those laws. In the ordinary accident
situation, the situs of the accident is completely irrelevant with
respect to the consequences of the accident. The consequences of
the accident and of allowing or denying recovery will be felt by
the parties in their home states, regardless of where the accident
109. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
110. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1623.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1625.
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occurs. Therefore, it is only the parties' home states that, depend-
ing on the content of their respective laws, may have a real interest
in having their law applied to determine liability arising from the
accident.
The fundamental criticism of the lex loci delicti rule advanced
by Currie-and not answered by Hill-is that it completely ignores
the policies and interests of the involved states. In the false conflict
situation, it frequently would require the application of the law of
the state that did not have any interest in applying its law to the
detriment of the state that had an interest. "3 In the true conflict
situation, it would require sacrificing the forum's real interests
simply on the ground that the accident happened in another state. 114
When Hill asserts that the lex loci delicti rule is premised on
the implementation of "governmental interests,""' 5 he is referring
only to the "generalized" interest of a state in applying its law to
determine the consequences of a tort occurring there, not the
interest of a state in applying its law to implement the policy
reflected in that law. 116 The presumptive applicability of the lex
loci delicti rule, as advocated by Hill, is essentially a rejection of
interest analysis as a basic approach to choice of law in torts cases.
To the extent that a consideration of policies and interests would
be relevant under Hill's thesis, it would only be to displace the
presumptively applicable lex loci delicti rule in a particular case.
Hill claims that the presumptively applicable lex loci delicti
rule "should not be applied unnecessarily to a wide range of
collateral issues." '7 Hill illustrates this point by referring to Judge
Fuld's opinion in Babcock v. Jackson,"18 where Fuld asserted that,
while New York law should apply on the issue of host-guest
immunity, Ontario law should apply on the question of the "right-
ness or wrongness"of the driver's conduct in Ontario." 9 Hill
continues that the "Neumeier rules" subsequently formulated by
Fuld,' 20 "assigned a wide scope for application of the lex loci
113. See Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 54, at 186-87.
114. Id. at 188-89.
115. See Reply, supra note 2, at 483.
116. While this "generalized" interest is sufficient to justify the application of
a state's law for constitutional purposes, it is not the kind of interest that is the
basis of the interest analysis approach to choice of law. Sedler, Constitutional
Limitations on Choice of Law: The Perspective of Constitutional Generalism, 10
HOFSTRA L. REv. 59, 71-72 (1981) [hereinafter Constitutional Limitations].
117. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1623.
118. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
119. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1624.
120. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972).
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delicti." 121 This statement is certainly true. Indeed, under the
"Neumeier rules," the lex loci delicti generally controls in interstate
accident cases where the parties reside in different states.' "
Hill does not fully endorse the proposition embodied in the
first Neumeier rule, which is that when the parties are from the
same state, the law of their home state should control. However,
when discussing the "reverse Babcock" situation-two parties from
a non-liability state involved in an accident in a liability state-
Hill asserts that the state of injury does not have a real interest
in applying its law to allow the non-resident injured there to
recover. He suggests that the state of injury "might do well to
exercise restraint in the interest of avoiding conflict with another
concerned jurisdiction." 1  Essentially, Hill argues that in this
situation, the law of the parties' home state, which denies recovery,
should apply because it is the only state that has a real interest in
applying its law to implement the policy reflected in that law. I
fully agree. 124
If, as Hill apparently concedes, the law of the parties' home
state should apply on some issues when the parties are from the
same state, it should not matter whether the laws of the involved
states differ on a "collateral issue," such as family immunity, or
on the issue of underlying liability. Suppose that two parties from
a comparative negligence state are involved in an accident in a
state in which contributory negligence is still an absolute bar to
recovery. The consequences of the accident and of allowing or
denying recovery will be felt by the parties in their home state.
Therefore, whether the point on which the laws of the involved
states differ relates to underlying liability or to a "collateral issue,"
the interest of the parties' home state in applying its law to
implement the policy reflected in that law is exactly the same. In
either case, the application of the lex loci delicti rule would require
the sacrifice of the real interests of the parties' home state without
121. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1624.
122. For a discussion of the operation of the "Neumeier rules" in practice,
see Rules of Choice of Law, supra note 104, at 983-94.
123. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1639-40. This was exactly what the
New York Court of Appeals did shortly after the publication of Professor Hill's
article. In Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 480 N.E.2d 679,
491 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1985), that court held that where the tort involving a New Jersey
victim and a New Jersey charity occurred in New York, New Jersey law, which
recognized charitable immunity, applied to bar the suit.
124. See e.g., Choice of Law in Michigan, supra note 60, at 1214-16.
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advancing any corresponding interest of the state where the acci-
dent occurred.
In any event, Hill may be conceding that the lex loci delicti
rule should not be applied in accident cases where both parties are
from the same state. The examples he gives of cases that call for
the application of the lex loci delicti rule are all cases where the
parties reside in different states. 125 I will consider the utility of the
lex loci delicti rule to resolve the choice of law issues presented in
these kinds of cases.
Regarding interest analysis, one set of examples Hill uses
involves the unprovided for case-the situation where neither state
has a real interest in applying its law to implement the policy
reflected in that law. In the context of an interstate accident, this
occurs when the defendant is from a non-liability state and the
plaintiff is from a liability state. Based on the assumption that the
state of injury has no real interest in applying its law to allow a
non-resident injured there to recover, the unprovided-for case is
presented when an accident occurs both in the plaintiff's home
state' 26 and in the defendant's home state. 2 7
In the case where the accident occurs in the plaintiff's home
state, Hill asserts that the concept of the unprovided-for case is
"pure fantasy" because it cannot be assumed that the legislature
of the defendant's home state, when enacting the law imposing
liability,' 21 had no "intent" with respect to the applicability of the
law in this situation.2 9 To the contrary, Hill claims its probable
"intent" was that the law should not be applied to benefit out of
state residents injured in their home state. 30 Here, like other
interest analysis critics,13 1 Professor Hill confuses "legislative in-
tent" with a state's interest in applying its law to implement the
125. It is in this context that Hill endorses the second and third "Neumeier"
rules.
126. See, e.g., Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 386 N.E.2d 454 (1972).
127. See, e.g., Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114
Cal. Rptr. 830 (1974). For a discussion of the unprovided-for case, see Choice of
Law in Michigan, supra note 60, at 1216-18.
128. In Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Or. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973), the defendant's
home state had enacted legislation creating a cause of action for loss of consortium
for the wife. However, in Labree v. Major, 111 R.I. 657, 306 A.2d 808 (1973),
another case Hill discusses, the defendant's home state had retained the common-
law rule which imposed liability for ordinary negligence in guest passenger cases.
129. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1603-04.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., BriUmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent,
78 MIcH. L. REv. 392 (1980).
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policy reflected in that law. Interest analysis is not premised on
effectuating a non-existent legislative intent. If the legislature had
an "intent" with respect to the applicability of a law to a situation
containing a foreign element, it would have expressed its "intent"
by including a legislative directive specifically dealing with the
law's applicability to that situation. It is only because the legislature
did not express its "intent," that the courts must resolve the
question of the law's applicability by making a choice of law
decision. Under interest analysis, the court makes the choice of
law decision by considering whether the policies reflected in the
differing laws of the involved states would be advanced by applying
them to the situation containing a foreign element.12
Where the plaintiff is from a non-liability state, that state has
a policy of protecting defendants from liability to plaintiffs. How-
ever, that state has no interest in applying this policy to enable a
non-resident defendant to avoid liability to a resident plaintiff.
Conversely, the law of the defendant's home state would enable
the plaintiff to recover. Yet, that state has no interest in applying
that law for the benefit of a non-resident plaintiff, since the
consequences of the accident and of allowing or denying recovery
will be felt by the plaintiff in the plaintiff's home state. In the
unprovided-for case, as regards the policies and interests of the
involved states, it is indeed true, contrary to Hill's assertion that
"neither state cares what happens."' 33 In any event, the place
where the accident occurred is irrelevant to the matter of the
policies and interests of the involved states in the unprovided-for
case, where the parties are from different states, as it is in the
false conflict situation, where the parties are from the same state.
The resolution of the unprovided-for case has given the courts
some difficulty in practice. This is in no small part because interest
analysis can only identify the unprovided-for case, but cannot
provide the means for its resolution. By definition, the means of
resolution must depend on something other than a consideration
of the advancement of the policies and interests of the involved
states. 13 4 My own view of the means of resolution of the unpro-
vided-for case refers to the common policies of the states involved,
which will usually result in the application of the law of the
132. See New Critics, supra note 56, at 606-10.
133. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1605.
134. See Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 54, at 233-36.
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defendant's home state, imposing liability.1 3 In practice, the suit
in the unprovided-for case is usually brought in the defendant's
home state. The majority of the courts dealing with this situation
have applied their own law and imposed liability, although some
have applied the law of the plaintiff's home state and denied
recovery. 13
6
The point I want to make now, however, is not whether the
more appropriate solution to the unprovided-for case is to apply
the law of the defendant's home state to impose liability, or the
law of the plaintiff's home state to deny recovery. Rather, my
point is that the place where the accident occurred is irrelevant in
arriving at this solution. In arguing for the presumptive applica-
bility of the lex loci delicti rule here, Professor Hill discusses the
Hurtado case, 137 where a Mexican victim was killed in California
due to the negligence of a California driver. The victim's survivors
brought suit in California, seeking to recover unlimited damages
for wrongful death under California law. The defendant contended
that Mexican law, which limited damages to a minimal amount in
American dollars, should apply. The California court applied
California law, allowing unlimited recovery. 3 Professor Hill agrees
with the result but faults the California court for engaging in an
unnecessary discussion of the policies and interests of the involved
states. 39 According to Hill, California law should have been ap-
plied under the lex loci delicti rule. He argues: "The issue before
the court-the right of the stranger injured within the gates-was
covered by a body of precedent which was striking in its univer-
sality, and the wisdom of which, as applied to such a case, had
never been seriously doubted."' 4
Suppose, however, that the fatal accident had occurred in
Mexico rather than in California. Under the lex loci delicti rule,
a court would apply Mexican law and limit recovery to a pittance. 4'
135. Id. The non-liability rule of the plaintiff's home state will usually be an
exception to the common policy of both states, which would impose tort liability.
136. See the discussion and review of cases in AcRoss STATE LNES, supra note
10, at 57-58.
137. Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr.
830 (1974). Professor Hill titles this example, "The Foreigner Injured in the Forum."
Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1608.
138. 11 Cal. 3d at 582-83, 522 P.2d at 671.
139. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1605.
140. Id. at 1610.
141. In Hernandez v. Burger, 102 Cal. App. 3d 795, 162 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1980),
a California intermediate appellate court reached this result, on the quite dubious
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In this situation, the lex loci delicti rule turns out to be nothing
more than a "tiebreaker." Where the parties are from different
states and neither state has an interest in applying its law in order
to implement the policy reflected in its law, the place where the
accident occurs becomes dispositive. This is an "easy" solution,
but it is one that is difficult to justify in terms of producing a
functionally sound result. The California driver and insurer will
feel the consequences of imposing liability in California, and it is
irrelevant, as regards to those consequences, whether the accident
occurred in California or in Mexico. It is difficult to see why the
result should differ depending on where the accident occurred, and
Professor Hill never attempts to explain why it should.
My own suspicion is that in the case where the accident
occurred in Mexico, Professor Hill would find a good reason for
displacing the presumptively applicable lex loci delicti rule. 142 He
might emphasize the unreasonableness of the Mexican rule, limiting
recovery for wrongful death to a pittance and the absence of an
unfair result in holding the California defendant and insurer to
the California standard of wrongful death liability. If my suspicion
is correct, this suggests that the presumptive applicability of the
lex loci delicti rule, as advocated by Professor Hill, would give a
grounds that Mexico had a policy of promoting tourism by Americans and that this
policy would be advanced by limiting the liability of an American tourist who killed
a Mexican victim in Mexico. Id. at 802, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 568. Professor Hill sees
this result as following from the California Supreme Court's discussion of policies
and interests in Hurtado, and says that in Hernandez, "[t]he court made no attempt
to explain how it reached this conclusion regarding Mexican policy." Judicial
Function, supra note 3, at 1610.
What happened in Hernandez, of course, was that the court either misunder-
stood or misapplied the interest analysis approach, for it did not properly identify
the policy reflected in the Mexican rule limiting damages recoverable for wrongful
death. The policy of the rule was to protect defendants generally from liability; it
was not to promote tourism by Americans as it applied to all wrongful death actions
and not merely to ones brought against American tourists. The policy, therefore,
would be advanced only by its application in favor of a Mexican defendant and
would not be advanced by its application in favor of a California defendant, because
the consequences of imposing unlimited liability would be felt by the California
defendant and insurer in California.
After criticizing the California court for its assumed misanalysis of Mexico's
policy and interest in this case, Professor Hill leaves Hernandez. He fails to point
out that under the lex loci delicti rule, Mexican law would apply here, just as
California law would apply in Hurtado.
142. In commenting on the third Neumeier rule, Professor Hill asserts that it
is "open-ended" and "invites explorations of different outcomes." Judicial Function,
supra note 3, at 1625 n.198.
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court the opportunity to avoid such application when it did not
like the substantive result produced-much in the way that courts
following the traditional approach would sometimes employ "ma-
nipulative techniques" to avoid reaching what they considered to
be a functionally unsound result. 4 1 In any event, in the unprovided-
for case, the application of the lex loci delicti rule turns out to be
a "tiebreaker," making the resolution of that situation depend on
where the accident happened to occur.
The same is true of the application of the lex loci delicti rule
to resolve the true conflict. Here, Hill uses a set of examples
"allowing the plaintiff to recover under the higher standard of his
domiciliary state," where the accident occurred in the defendant's
home state. 44 He notes that in some of these cases "courts have
given the plaintiff the 'benefit of the more favorable recovery rule
of his own state in circumstances where the defendant could have
had no idea of the identity, let alone domicile, of the person
whom he injured."' 45 One of the cases that Hill uses to illustrate
this situation is Schwartz v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.146 A
Minnesota driver was involved in an accident in Ohio with a
vehicle driven by an employee of an Ohio interstate trucking
company. Due to the extensive business the company conducted
in Minnesota, it was subject to general jurisdiction on the basis
of forum-defendant contacts. Under Ohio law, the plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence would be a complete bar to recovery. Min-
nesota followed comparative negligence. In the suit in Minnesota,
the Minnesota court held that Minnesota law applied on the issue
of contributory fault and allowed partial recovery. 47
This case illustrates the irrelevance of the place of injury in
providing a functionally sound solution to the true conflict situa-
tion. In the interstate accident context, a true conflict is presented
whenever the plaintiff is from a recovery state and the defendant
is from a non-recovery state because each party will feel the
consequences of the accident and of allowing or denying recovery
in their respective home states. The place where the accident
occurred is completely irrelevant. Under the forum preference
solution to the true conflict, advocated by Currie and myself, the
forum should apply its own law in order to implement the policy
143. See ACROSS STATE LnEs, supra note 10, at 32-33.
144. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1608.
145. Id. at 1607.
146. 300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976).
147. 300 Minn. at 493, 221 N.W.2d at 669.
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reflected in that law, so long as the application of that law is not
fundamentally unfair to the other party. Thus, in a case like
Schwartz where a suit can be brought in the plaintiff's home state,
that state should apply its own law and allow recovery, notwith-
standing that the accident occurred in the defendant's home state.148
In practice, courts generally reach this result. 149
148. See Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 54, at 227-33.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that, in the absence of fundamental
unfairness, there is no constitutional objection to the plaintiffs home state applying
its law to impose liability against an out-of-state defendant for an accident occurring
in the defendant's home state. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). As
Justice Brennan stated: "An automobile accident need not occur within a particular
jurisdiction for that jurisdiction to be connected with the occurrence." Id. at 314.
The injury or death of a resident of State A in State B is a contact of State A
with the occurrence in State B." Id. at 315 n.20. See also Constitutional Limitations,
supra note 116, at 72-73.
In Schwartz, the Minnesota court was not acting unfairly in applying its own
law on the issue of contributory fault, as the defendant's driver did not rely on the
Ohio contributory negligence rule before becoming involved in the accident and the
defendant's automobile liability policy covered the vehicle in any state in which it
was driven.
Where the defendant acted entirely within the confines of its home state,
justifiably relied on the law of that state, and conformed conduct to the requirements
of that state's law, it could be fundamentally unfair to hold the defendant liable
under the law of the plaintiffs home state. In cases where the issue related to the
liability of a landowner for harm suffered by persons on the land, the courts of
the plaintiffs home state (where the defendant was subject to general jurisdiction
on the basis of "doing business") have applied the law of the defendant's home
state, which did not impose liability in the circumstances presented. See Barrett v.
Foster Grant Co., 450 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1971) (applying New Hampshire law);
Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721 (1978).
See also Levin v. Desert Palace Inc., 318 Pa. Super. 606, 465 A.2d 1019 (1983),
which held that the Nevada standard of care governed the liability of a Nevada
innkeeper for the theft of property from the room of a Pennsylvania guest. Id. at
612-13, 465 A.2d at 1022.
The law of the defendant's home state was applied because the defendant was
justifiably entitled to rely on that state law and conform its conduct to the
requirements of that law in Blakesley v. Wolford, 789 F.2d 236 (3rd Cir. 1986)
(applying Pennsylvania law) as well. Here, a Pennsylvania patient, through arrange-
ments made by her physicians, had consulted with a prominent Texas oral surgeon
who was visiting the area in Pennsylvania where she lived. She went to Texas to
have the surgery performed by the defendant. In a malpractice action brought in
Pennsylvania (the defendant apparently made no objection to the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction in Pennsylvania), the Third Circuit, sitting as a Pennsylvania court, held
that the Texas law of "informed consent," which was more favorable to the
physician, and the Texas "cap" on malpractice damages should apply. Id. at 243.
149. See the discussion and review of cases in AcRoss STATE Lunqs, supra note
10, at 53-57.
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Again, my point is not whether or not forum preference is the
most appropriate solution to the true conflict in interstate accident
cases. Rather, it is that, just as in regard to the resolution of the
unprovided-for case, the application of the lex loci delicti rule to
resolve the true conflict, as advocated by Hill, is nothing more
than a "tiebreaker." As such, the lex loci delicti rule makes the
resolution of the situation dependent on where the accident oc-
curred. Again, Hill never explains why this proposed resolution of
the true conflict will lead to functionally sound results.
Thus far I have dealt with Hill's proposed application of the
lex loci delicti rule to the situation where both the allegedly
wrongful act and the harm occurred in the same state. Hill's
examples do not include the classic "multi-state tort," where an
allegedly wrongful act in one state produces the harm in another
state. Under the lex loci delicti rule, as it operated under the
traditional approach, the "place of the wrong" was the place
where the harm occurred. 150
Consider the result that this application of the lex loci delicti
rule would produce in a case where the plaintiff and the defendant
were residents of the same state, the law of which imposes liability,
and the act of the defendant in the home state caused injury to
the plaintiff in another state, the law of which does not impose
liability. The lex loci delicti rule would displace the law of the
parties' home state in favor of the law of the state of injury,
denying recovery.' 5' Perhaps in such a case Professor Hill might
say that the law of the parties' home state should displace the
presumptively applicable lex loci delicti rule. Why should this
occur? The answer, I submit, is that the parties' home state has
a real interest in applying its law to implement the compensatory
policy embodied in that law, and if the law in question reflects
an admonitory or regulatory policy, that policy as well. Conversely,
the state of injury has no interest in applying its law to protect a
non-resident actor from liability that is imposed by the law of the
actor's home state.
150. See REsTATEmmNT OF CONFUCT OF LAws § 377 (1934); Alabama Great S.
Ry. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892).
151. This was the result in Carroll. In Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, 249 Minn.
376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957), the Minnesota court refused to apply the law of
Wisconsin, where the accident occurred, and instead applied the Minnesota dram
shop act to enable a Minnesota victim to recover against the Minnesota tavern that




Continuing with the "multi-state tort," whenever the policy
behind a state's substantive rule of tort law is admonitory or
regulatory, and the conduct occurred in that state, it has a real
interest in applying its law to implement the policy. This interest
is totally apart from its interest in implementing any compensatory
policy reflected in that law. Thus, it would not matter, with respect
to implementing this admonitory or regulatory policy, that the
injury occurred in another state, injuring a resident of that state.
Assuming that the law of the state of injury would not impose
liability for the conduct in question, in terms of interest analysis,
this is a false conflict. In practice, suit will usually be brought in
the defendant's home state, and that state will apply its own law
imposing liability. 52 By the same token, where an act done in one
state foreseeably could produce harm in another state and in fact
injures a resident of that state, the state where the injury occurs
will apply its own law allowing recovery.'53 This is not because the
152. See, e.g., Corrigan v. Bjork Shiley Corp., 182 Cal. App. 3d 166, 227 Cal.
Rptr. 247 (1986), cert. denied sub nom. 479 U.S. 1049 (1987); Gaither v. Myers,
404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Lichter v. Fritsch, 77 Wis. 2d 178, 252 N.W.2d 360
(1977). See also In re Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport, 750 F. Supp. 793 (E.D.
Mich. 1989) (same result obtained when suit was brought in the victim's home
state).
153. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128
Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976). The defendant was a
Nevada liquor establishment doing business near the California border and adver-
tising extensively in California. It served liquor to an intoxicated patron, who later
was involved in an accident injuring a California plaintiff. Plaintiff filed suit in
California, where the Nevada liquor establishment could constitutionally be subject
to jurisdiction because of its extensive advertising in California, directed toward
California residents. California applied its law allowing recovery. Id. at 318-19, 546
P.2d at 725-26, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 217-18.
In Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974), the putative father,
a resident of Pennsylvania, sued for a declaration of paternity against the child's
mother, a resident of Wisconsin. The mother counterclaimed to recover for seduction,
an action which was recognized at that time under Wisconsin law, but had been
abolished in Pennsylvania and in New Jersey, where the sexual acts had taken place.
The Wisconsin court applied Wisconsin law, granting recovery, on the ground that
the harm from the seduction was suffered by the mother in Wisconsin. Id. at 311-
13, 215 N.W.2d at 19. Professor Hill includes this case in the series of examples
"allowing the plaintiff to recover under the higher standard of his domiciliary state"
and criticizes the result on the grounds that, "[tihere was no suggestion in the
court's opinion that the defendant was in any way chargeable with knowledge that
his conduct might ultimately be governed by Wisconsin law." Judicial Function,
supra note 3, at 1608. But the defendant was indeed "chargeable with knowledge
that his conduct might ultimately be governed by Wisconsin law," because he knew
that the woman was a resident of Wisconsin and could foresee that any harm
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accident occurred there, but because that state has a real interest
in applying its law to promote its compensatory policy reflected
in that law.
Professor Hill does not discuss the application of the lex loci
delicti rule to resolve conflicts questions arising with respect to the
"multi-state tort." I have demonstrated, however, that with regard
to both the implementation of admonitory/regulatory and com-
pensatory policies, the place where the accident occurred is com-
pletely irrelevant in such cases.
The irrelevance of the place of injury also appears in the
context of product liability cases. Here, the primarily interested
states are the victim's home state, if its products law favors victims,
and the manufacturer's home state, if its products law favors
manufacturers. Ordinarily, the victim will be injured in the victim's
home state. Where that state's law favors victims, the victim will
bring suit there and will, of course, get the benefit of its victim-
favoring law. 154 However, the interest of that state in applying its
victim-favoring law would be the same if the actual injury occurred
in another state. Provided that the manufacturer ships products
into the victim's home state, the manufacturer can be sued there,
and that state may be expected to apply its victim-favoring law
regardless of where the accident occurred. By the same token, if
the law of the manufacturer's home state favors manufacturers,
that state will apply its own law in the event that the suit is
brought there. 55
The more difficult case in practice is the one where the law of
the victim's home state is manufacturer-favoring while the law of
the manufacturer's home state is victim-favoring. Where the law
of the manufacturer's home state is found to reflect an admonitory
or regulatory policy, 156 that state has a real interest in applying its
caused to her by his "seduction" would be suffered by her in Wisconsin. Thus, the
application of Wisconsin law on the issue of liability for "seduction" was fully
foreseeable to the defendant at the time he "seduced" the woman in New Jersey.
Even more interesting, as regards Hill's criticism of the result, is that because the
harm was suffered by the woman in Wisconsin, Wisconsin would be the "place of
the wrong" within the meaning of the lex loci delicti rule.
154. See, e.g., Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 N.H. 248, 266 A.2d 855
(1970).
155. See Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1987), where
both the victim and the manufacturer were Indiana residents and the product was
manufactured there. The accident occurred in Illinois. The Indiana court applied its
own law, which favored the manufacturer. Id. at 1704.




own law in order to implement that policy and will do so not-
withstanding that the accident occurred in another state, injuring
a resident of that state. 15 7 Where the law of the manufacturer's
home state does not reflect an admonitory or regulatory policy,'
in terms of interest analysis, the unprovided-for case is presented.
Here, contrary to the more typical disposition of the unprovided-
for case, the courts tend to look to the law of the victim's home
state and limit the victim to the lower standard of protection
provided by that law.1 59
Again, in the products liability context, the place where the
accident occurred turns out to be completely irrelevant. The court
approaches the issue in terms of whether it should apply the law
of the victim's home state or the law of the manufacturer's home
state. While the accident usually occurs in the victim's home state,
the justification for applying the law of that state is not that the
accident occurred there, but that the victim resides there and will
feel the consequences of the accident in that state. Where a court
applies the law of the manufacturer's home state, it is, of course,
irrelevant that the accident occurred in another state.
As the above discussion demonstrates, the lex loci delicti rule
is not useful, even presumptively, to resolve the choice of law
issues presented in conflicts torts cases. Most significantly, it
neglects to consider the real interests of the involved states, and
is not designed to do so. In the false conflict situation, it could
require the application of the law of the state that had no interest
to the detriment of the state that did. In the true conflict and
unprovided-for case it is nothing more than a "tiebreaker." I have
shown that it is completely irrelevant in the "multi-state tort"
context, where the focus is on the admonitory or regulatory policy
of the state of acting or the compensatory policy of the victim's
home state. It is also irrelevant in the products liability context,
where the focus is on the states where the victim resides and where
157. See, e.g., Corrigan v. Bjork Shiley Corp., 182 Cal. App. 3d 166, 227 Cal.
Rptr. 247 (1986). Again, this is the result obtained in In re Disaster at Detroit
Metro. Airport, 750 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Mich. 1989), where the suit was brought
in the victim's home state.
158. As in Michigan, where liability is imposed only on the basis of negligence
and recovery of punitive damages is not allowed.
159. See, e.g., Deemer v. Silk City Textile Mach. Co., 193 N.J. Super. 643,
475 A.2d 648 (App. Div. 1984); Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 339,
474 N.E.2d 286 (1984); Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932 (Me. 1982). In
Michigan, under the lexfori approach, Michigan law applies in this situation. Mahne
v. Ford Motor Co., 900 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 349 (1990).
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the product was manufactured. With all due respect, Professor
Hill is just plain wrong when he says that the lex loci delicti rule
"goes far to advance sensible policies of fairness and accommo-
dation in a community of states."' 16 Its application distorts the
analysis of the real interests of the involved states and could lead
to functionally unsound results. Despite its "hoary antecedents,"
it has no place whatsoever in the resolution of the conflicts torts
problems that arise in the modern world.
B. Party Autonomy in Contracts Cases
Hill asserts that the basic conflicts principle applicable to
contracts is party autonomy. Under this principle, a court would
recognize the parties' express choice of law and, in the absence of
an express choice of law, the court would look to the law impliedly
intended by the parties.16' Hill's traditional rule is not the lex loci
contractus, which Hill claims was a break with continuity and
precedent, but the rule of party autonomy. 16 2 Hill finds that the
Restatement Second is generally supportive of this rule, both in
regard to its emphasis on recognition of the parties' express choice
of law and to its use of the "state of the most significant
relationship" concept. Hill argues that the latter will often lead to
the same result as looking to the "implied intention" of the
parties. 16 13
Hill's justification for the rule of party autonomy is the familiar
one that recognition of party autonomy enables the parties to
achieve predictability in an area where predictability is very im-
portant. Furthermore, the "necessary accommodation" between
the interests of "trading states" will be achieved most fairly and
effectively by accepting the terms upon which the parties agreed.' 64
As a general proposition, this point cannot be disputed, and I
agree for the same reasons Hill provides-that in at least some
circumstances, application of the rule of party autonomy will
produce functionally sound results.
The clearest example of such a circumstance is where the matter
in issue is one of construction and interpretation. Such a matter
160. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1623.
161. Id. at 1625-27.
162. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
164. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1626-27.
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is within the parties' contractual capacity and the governing in-
strument could have covered it. The substantive law of contract
construction and interpretation serves merely to "fill in the gaps"
left in the parties' contract. When the parties have provided that
the law of a particular state "governs" their contract, they have
essentially incorporated by reference that state's contract construc-
tion and interpretation law into the terms of their contract. Since
there is no reason to limit the parties' ability to incorporate the
law of a state by reference in this way, the so-called "choice of
law" with respect to matters of construction and interpretation
will always be recognized, as it should be. 65
I also agree that, with respect to such matters, the courts
should look to the law "impliedly intended" by the parties where
no express choice was made. The Restatement Second's localizing
concept of the state of the most significant relationship may be
useful to determine this "implied intent." When it is possible to
localize the contract in a particular state on the basis of factual
contacts that the contract had with that state, it can be asserted
that this is the law that the parties would have intended to apply
if they had thought about the matter. It is sound to look to the
law of that state on questions of construction and interpretation
because these questions could have been covered by the parties in
their contract. Looking to the law of that state on these questions
serves the predictability objective of party autonomy.' 66
However, Hill's party autonomy rule runs into difficulty when
it is relied upon to determine questions of validity and enforcea-
bility, which are questions beyond the contractual capacity of the
party. Like the Restatement Second, Hill advocates application of
the party autonomy rule with respect to validity and enforceability
questions, except for the "overriding character of laws designed
to implement special regulatory or protective policies."' 67 Hill does
not discuss this point in detail, but implicit in his position, and
explicit in the position taken by the Restatement Second, is that
"policy" exceptions to the party autonomy rule should be rare.
According to the Restatement Second, party autonomy should
control questions going to validity unless application of the law
of the chosen state would be contrary to a "fundamental policy"
of the state whose law would otherwise apply, and the latter state
165. See AcRoss STATE Lnms, supra note 10, at 72; Sedler, The Contracts
Provisions of the Restatement (Second): An Analysis and a Critique, 72 CoLUM. L.
REv. 279, 286-90 (1972) [hereinafter The Contracts Provisions].
166. See AcRoss STATE LnEs, supra note 10, at 76-77; The Contract Provisions,
supra note 165, at 299-302.
167. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1627.
19921 1453
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
had a "materially greater" interest than the chosen state in the
determination of the particular issue. 68
My own view regarding party autonomy distinguishes between
matters that, while analytically addressing validity, do not involve
a strong policy of the forum or the state whose law would be
applied in the absence of party autonomy, and those matters that
involve a strong policy. I would recognize party autonomy only
with respect to validity questions that do not involve a strong
policy, such as whether the contract satisfies the requirement of
consideration. Otherwise, I maintain that the courts should reject
party autonomy to resolve validity questions. A court should make
the choice of law decision in contract cases, as in any other, with
reference to considerations of policy and fairness to the parties,
including implementation of the forum's own policy and interest. 169
The operation of the party autonomy rule in practice is ana-
lyzed best by reviewing the cases that involve recognition of the
parties' express choice of law as to matters of validity and en-
forceability. In practice, there are a large number of cases where
the courts frequently cite the Restatement Second in support of
recognition of the parties' express choice of law with respect to
such matters. However, in many of these cases, the law chosen by
the parties is the law that the court would have applied even in
the absence of an express choice. In a number of these cases, it
does not appear that a conflict of laws even existed. The "true"
recognition of an express choice of law case is where the court is
asked to recognize an express choice of law that would displace
the law that the court otherwise would apply.
It is fair to say that in practice the court usually will not
recognize the parties' express choice of law if the matter at issue
involves a strong policy of either the forum or the state whose
law the forum would apply in the absence of an express choice.
Most of the invalidating rules that are at issue in the cases that
arise in practice do involve strong policies. For this reason, rec-
ognition is frequently refused in the "true" recognition of express
choice of law case. Recognition has been refused in cases involving
168. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1988).
169. The Contracts Provisions, supra note 165, at 302-15. In contract cases,
of course, there is a greater possibility that the parties may have relied on the law
of a particular state, such as the state whose law was expressly chosen, so that the




the validity of covenants not to compete, 170 solicitation and sales
of securities in violation of the forum's securities regulation law,'7 '
the automatic change of beneficiary in a life insurance contract
following the divorce of the insured and the beneficiary, 72 franchise
revocation, 73 and the validity of "built-in" contractual limitation
periods. 74 Sometimes a court will recognize the express choice of
law even in these situations, especially if the court expressly follows
the Restatement Second's approach.' 75 Yet, for the most part, in
the "true" recognition case involving a strong policy of the forum
or the state whose law would otherwise be applied, 76 the express
choice of law will not be recognized. 177
In the absence of an effective choice of law, many courts in
practice invoke the Restatement Second's localizing concept of the
state of the most significant relationship, which Hill regards as
useful to determine the "implied intention" of the parties. Hill
also makes the point that "an approach in terms of likely intent
may be more fruitful on its negative than on its positive side" in
that it prevents application of a law that the parties would not
have intended to apply. 7 1
It is my submission that, with respect to issues of validity and
enforceability, the courts generally make the choice of law decision
170. See, e.g., Barnes Group, Inc. v. C & C Prod. Co., 716 F.2d 1023 (4th
Cir. 1983) (applying South Carolina law).
171. See Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., 366 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Iowa 1973)
(applying Iowa law).
172. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Field, 451 F.2d 1292 (6th Cir. 1971) (applying
Kentucky law).
173. See, e.g., Carlos v. Philips Business Sys., Inc., 556 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (applying New York law).
174. See, e.g., Suntogs of Miami v. Burroughs Corp., 433 So. 2d 581 (Fla.
App. 1983).
175. See, e.g., Tele-Save Merchandising Co. v. Consumers Distrib. Co., 814
F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying Ohio law). In Tele-Save, the choice of law
provision in favor of New Jersey law in the supply agreement between an Ohio
corporation and a Canadian corporation with an office in New Jersey was recognized
to preclude the application of Ohio law regulating sale of business opportunity
plans. Id. at 1123.
176. For a case where the forum refused to recognize an express choice of its
own law, see Winer Motors, Inc. v. Jaguar Rover Triumph, 208 N.J. Super. 666,
506 A.2d 817 (1986). New Jersey, the franchisor's home state, refused to recognize
an express choice of New Jersey law to govern the rights of the parties to a franchise
agreement. Instead, the court looked to the law of the franchisor's home state,
Connecticut. Id. at 672-73, 506 A.2d at 821.
177. See AcRoss. STATE Llwus, supra note 10, at 73-75.
178. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1635.
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with reference to considerations of policy and fairness to the
parties. This includes those courts that invoke the Restatement
Second's state of the most significant relationship concept. Courts
will apply their own law, when they have a real interest in doing
so, to implement the policy reflected in that law, provided that
the application is not unfair to the other party. 7 9
It is with respect to the matter of fairness where Professor
Hill's point about "implied intention" on the negative side becomes
important. In contract cases, precisely because the parties have
planned their transaction in advance, there must be greater concern
with justifiable reliance on the law of a particular state and the
resulting unfairness if the law of that state is not applied. At the
same time, when a contract is connected with more than one state,
and it is not disputed that the contract exists, the parties could
foresee the application of either state's law to determine their
rights and liabilities under the contract at the time of contracting.
In practice, unfairness in the application of a particular state's
law in a contract case is most likely to occur when that state's
interest in applying its law is predicated on events that have
occurred subsequent to the time of the original transaction. In
that circumstance, what was initially a purely domestic case has
now become a conflicts case, and Hill's point about "implied
intention" on the negative side becomes well taken. To apply the
law of the state with the "subsequent interest," so to speak, may
be fundamentally unfair because the parties may not have foreseen
the application of that state's law at the time the parties entered
into the transaction.
This situation is illustrated by the following two cases. In the
first case, Roesgen v. American Home Products Corp. ,180 a New
York resident, employed by a corporation at its New York head-
quarters, was supposed to receive contingent stock credits in each
of the ten years following the termination of his employment with
the corporation as part of his employment compensation. One of
the conditions was that the employee refrain from engaging in
employment with the corporation's competitors. If the employee
violated the condition, he would forfeit all the contingent stock
credits. In this case, the employee left the corporation to accept
employment with a competitor in California. When the employee
was notified that his stock payments would be discontinued, he
brought suit against his former employer in California, where the
179. See generally the discussion and review of cases in-AcRoss STATE LInrS,
supra note 10, at 75-83. The exception is in regard to claims of usury, where the
courts frequently apply a lender-favoring "rule of validity." Id. at 83-85.
180. 719 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1983).
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corporation also conducted business. He contended that the for-
feiture provision, which was admittedly valid under New York
law, constituted an illegal restriction on employment under Cali-
fornia law. The California court applied New York law in up-
holding the provision because the employment relationship was
centered in New York at the time the employee resided there and
the only legitimate expectation of the parties at the time they
entered into the employment contract was that New York law
would apply to any disputes under the contingent stock credit
plan. 181
In the second case, Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. Lapp,8 2
the parties were domiciled in Colorado, a separate property state,
when the husband entered into a loan transaction with a Colorado
corporation. The husband used the loan in connection with his
Colorado business, and ixecuted a promissory note making him
personally liable for the entire amount of the loan. Under Colorado
law, marital property was available to satisfy the debt of either
spouse.' After the husband defaulted on the loan, the parties
moved to Washington, a community property state. Under Wash-
ington law, the martial community would not be liable for the
debt of a spouse unless both spouses agreed to encumber marital
property in payment of the debt. 8 4 In the creditor's suit against
the husband and the martial community in Washington, the court
held that Colorado laiv applied and that the marital community
was liable on the note. The court explained that because the parties
were domiciled in Colorado at the time they executed the contract,
the Colorado creditor was entitled to expect that the marital
property would be available to satisfy the husband's debt.'85 Al-
though Washington had an interest in applying its law to protect
181. Id. A comparable situation was presented in Freeze v. American Home
Prod. Corp., 839 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying Iowa law). Here, the employee
performed the work in Iowa, but each year the letter informing the employee that
he was entitled to contingent stock awards was sent from the corporation's home
office in New York. The letter stated that any legal questions arising under the
incentive program would be determined by New York law. The court held that
Iowa would apply New York law, under which the forfeiture provision was valid.
719 F.2d at 321. It was significant here that the incentive program was available to
all of the corporation's employees, working in different states, so that the corporation
and the employees were able to look to the law of a single state with respect to
rights and obligations under the program. Id.
182. 95 Wash. 2d 341, 622 P.2d 850 (1980).
183. Id. at 344, 622 P.2d at 854.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 348-50, 622 P.2d at 856-57.
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the current marital community, its application in this case would
be fundamentally unfair to the Colorado creditor, who was entitled
to rely on Colorado law which makes all marital property available
to satisfy the husband's debt. 186
Where the application of either state's law to determine rights
and liabilities under the contract is fully fair to both parties, and
the matter as to which the law differs involves a strong policy of
the forum or other involved state, "implied intention" or "local-
ization" is no longer relevant in the choice of law decision. The
forum can be expected to apply its own law to implement the
policy reflected in that law whenever it has a real interest in doing
so. Similarly, when the forum does not have a real interest in
doing so, but the other state does, the forum can be expected to
recognize the other state's interest. As I have said, this is the
general result in practice. 18 7
In assessing the utility of Professor Hill's party autonomy rule
to achieve functionally sound results in the contracts area, I have
concluded that Hill's rule is very useful with respect to matters of
construction and interpretation. It is also useful in matters that,
while analytically going to validity, do not involve a strong policy
of the forum or other involved state, such as the requirements of
consideration. I have also concluded that looking to the law
"impliedly intended" by the parties may be helpful in determining
whether the parties were justified in relying on that law at the
time they executed the contract, so that the application of the law
of another state to determine rights and liabilities under the
contract would be fundamentally unfair.
Professor Hill's advocacy of the party autonomy rule, however,
goes further; he would apply it to determine most questions of
validity and enforceability, including those that implicate a strong
policy of the forum or other involved state. While he does not
elaborate on his exception for the "overriding character of laws
186. Compare Potlatch No.1 Fed. Credit Union v. Kennedy, 76 Wash. 2d 806,
459 P.2d 32 (1969). There the spouses were domiciled in Washington at all times.
The husband encumbered community property in a transaction with an Idaho
creditor in Idaho. The marital community would not be liable for the debt under
Washington law because it did not receive any benefit from the transaction, but
would be liable under Idaho law. Id. at 808, 459 P.2d at 34. Since the Idaho
creditor knew that he was dealing with a Washington community at the time he
entered into the transaction, no unfairness would result from the application of
Washington law. Thus the Washington court applied Washington law to protect the
Washington marital community. Id. at 812-13, 459 P.2d at 37.
187. See AcRoss STATE Lunms, supra note 10, at 75-85.
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designed to implement special regulatory or protective policies,'
I think implicit in his position is that "policy" exceptions to the
party autonomy rule should be fairly rare. 8 9 In this regard, as
with Hill's proposed presumptive applicability of the lex loci delicti
rule in torts cases, Hill's proposed party autonomy rule in contract
cases is in essence a rejection of interest analysis as a basic
approach to choice of law in this area as well
It is my submission, of course, that interest analysis as a basic
approach to choice of law leads to functionally sound results in
contract cases as well as in the torts area. The only difference is
that in the contracts area, because the parties have planned their
transaction in advance, there must be greater concern with justi-
fiable reliance on the law of a particular state and the resulting
unfairness if a court applies the law of another state in its stead.
However, experience indicates that the concern for fairness can be
accommodated within the framework of interest analysis, 19° and
this is no less true in the contracts area than in the torts area.
Unlike the presumptive applicability of the lex loci delicti rule
in torts cases, however, the presumptive applicability of the party
autonomy rule to issues of validity and enforceability in contracts
cases should not be harmful to the objective of achieving func-
tionally sound results. The rule can be applied to resolve the choice
of law issue in cases where the issue does not implicate a strong
policy of the forum or other involved state. Looking to the law
"impliedly intended" by the parties may be helpful in resolving
any question of "fundamental unfairness." However, most ques-
tions of validity and enforceability do implicate a strong policy of
either the forum or the other involved state. The party autonomy
rule should not be used to supplant interest analysis as the preferred
means of resolving those questions. To the extent that this view
represents a break with "continuity and precedent," it is because
interest analysis itself makes such a break. Ard if, as I believe I
have demonstrated, interest analysis produces functionally sound
results in contracts cases, that break is fully justified.
188. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 627.
189. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
190. As I have emphasized many times, fairness to the parties is an independent
choice of law consideration. A state will not-and constitutionally cannot-apply
its own law in any situation in which to do so would be fundamentally unfair to
the party against whom the law is sought to be applied. Moreover, the same factors
that would produce possible unfairness in the application of a state's law often will
also indicate the lack of a real interest in applying that law. See, e.g., New Critics,
supra note 56, at 611-15.
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C. The Traditional Property and Succession Rules
It is in the area of property and succession that the traditional
rules will produce functionally sound results in most of their
applications. Hill notes that in this area, "the occasional decisions
that surface typically follow traditional practice."' 9' I agree and
have said that "in this area the courts generally follow the rules
of the traditional approach, and for the most part the application
of these rules produces functionally sound results in practice."' 92
This is true because, regardless of the conceptual premises of
the traditional rules, they usually do serve to implement consid-
erations of policy and fairness to the parties in the area of property
and sucession. Nowhere is this more clear than with respect to the
use of the situs rule to determine the existence and incidents of
property interests in land and movable property. Professor Hill
carefully explains how the situs rule reflects both the recognition
of the interest of the situs in regulating such matters and the
protection of the parties' reliance interests. 93 I take the identical
position:
The situs has a real interest in applying its law to determine
the validity and effect of transfers of property there. In
addition, where there is a consensual transfer of property,
the parties must be able to look to the law of a particular
state so that they can know whether a valid transfer was
effected and the nature of the interest that was created by
the transfer. The law of the situs is the most logical one
for the parties to look to in the case of tangible property,
and they can be expected to conform their behavior to the
requirements of that law. 94
Professor Hill maintains that in some situations, "the appli-
cation of situs law is not readily justifiable, and may even be
191. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1586.
192. See AcRoss STATE Ln, s, supra note 10, at 85.
193. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1628-30.
194. AcRoss STATE LuNEs, supra note 10, at 88-89. There are special rules to
determine the situs of different kinds of intangible property. For example, the situs
of a debt is the domicile of the debtor, and the situs of corporate stock, as regards
the shareholder and the corporation, is the state of incorporation. Id.
The Uniform Commercial Code specifically governs rights of parties to a
security agreement. It sets forth rules "governing the perfection of security interests
in multiple state transactions." Id. at 90-93.
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indefensible.' ' 95 He uses as an example a claim involving the
underlying contract rather than the validity and effect of the
transfer itself; he asserts that the law applicable to the contract
should determine such a claim. 96 Beyond this example, the way I
would put it is that where the matter in issue involves considera-
tions other than validity and effect of the transfer, another state
may have a real interest in applying its law to determine this
matter, while the situs may not have such an interest. Thus, where
a conveyance of land between family members would give rise to
a constructive trust under the law of the domicile, but not under
the law of the situs, the court should look to the law of the
domicile to determine whether a constructive trust was created. 19
Similarly, where the situs of movable property at the time of the
transfer was not the intended state of principal use, and the
intended state of principal use was known to both parties, the
court should apply the law of the state of principal use to determine
the validity and effect of the transfer. 19 The law of the state of
principal use should also apply to determine the validity of an
action with respect to the property, such as repossession, occurring
in another state. 99
The above examples clearly indicate the difference between
Professor Hill's view that the traditional rules should only be
presumptively applicable and the rigid application of the rules of
the traditional approach. Under Hill's view, in any case involving
the validity and effect of a transfer of property, the law of the
situs of the land or the situs of the movable at the time of transfer
is presumptively applicable. But, as Hill says, "[e]xceptions can
be grafted on the rule as needed," 200 and, as in the above examples,
these exceptions are "needed" when the application of the situs
rule would produce a functionally unsound result by failing to
give effect to another state's real interest or by defeating the
parties' legitimate expectations.
Hill impliedly criticizes the traditional rule of "split succes-
sion"-succession to movable property is determined by the law
195. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1629.
196. Id.
197. See Rudow v. Fogel, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 430, 426 N.E.2d 155 (1981) (situs
court reaches same result).
198. See, e.g., Shanahan v. George B. Landers Constr. Co., 266 F.2d 400 (1st
Cir. 1959) (applying Massachusetts law).
199. See, e.g., Industrial Credit Co. v. J.A.D. Constr. Corp., 29 A.D. 2d 952,
289 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1968).
200. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1630.
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of the decedent's last domicile, while succession to land is deter-
mined by the law of the situs-when he notes that, "[i]n much of
the rest of the world, immovables (like movables) pass in accor-
dance with the domiciliary or national law [of the decedent.]" '20 1
Let us assume then that the presumptively applicable rule that Hill
would favor is that the law of the decedent's last domicile deter-
mines succession to property, including both land and movables.
Such a rule would produce functionally sound results in most
cases. The domicile has a real interest in determining succession
to the property of its domiciliary, and under this rule the decedent
could look to the law of the domicile to determine the validity
and effect of any proposed testamentary disposition. Moreover,
such a rule would ensure that ordinarily all of the decedent's
property would descend under a single law. The situs is interested
in applying its law to determine succession to situs land only when
the matter in issue involves a land utilization policy of the situs,
such as that reflected in its "mortmain" law or its rule against
perpetuities. The situs has no interest in applying its law to
determine other questions relating to succession, and, as in the
case of movables, these questions should be determined by the law
of the decedent's domicile. In practice, sometimes the courts of
the situs have employed "manipulative techniques," such as the
"equitable conversion" fiction, to displace situs law with respect
to such matters and to effectively apply the law of the domicile. 202
I have suggested that if a court squarely faced the question today,
it might well hold that, except as to matters involving a land
utilization policy of the situs, the law of the decedent's domicile
should govern the succession to land, as it does the succession to
movables .203
The rule that we have arrived at, which I think Professor Hill
would favor, is that succession to property is presumptively gov-
erned by the law of the decedent's last domicile. The exception to
201. Id. at 1629.
202. See AcRoss STATE Lmis, supra note 10, at 87.
203. Id. As a practical matter, the situs courts usually would have to render
this decision because the estate will be administered there with respect to situs land.
Compare In re Estate of Janney, 498 Pa. 398, 446 A.2d 1265 (1982). The decedent
died domiciled in Pennsylvania, owning land in New Jersey. Under New Jersey law,
as it stood at the time of the execution of the decedent's will, the will would be
invalid. The land was sold, and the proceeds formed part of the estate, which was
being administered in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania court held that Pennsylvania
law was applicable and upheld the will. Id. at 402-03, 446 A.2d at 1267.
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that rule occurs in the case of succession to land; the situs will
apply its own law when this is necessary to implement a land
utilization policy of the situs.
The other exception, which I think Professor Hill would
also favor, is suggested by two "casebook favorites" used to
illustrate general principles of domicile, White v. Tennant20 4
and In re Estate of Jones.205 In both of these cases, the courts
applied the traditional rule that succession to movables is
determined by the law of the decedent's domicile at the time
of death. The issue in both of these cases related to where the
decedent was domiciled at that time for purposes of the rule.
In White v. Tennant, the decedent, who had previously lived
on the West Virginia side of a West Virginia-Pennsylvania
family owned tract of land, moved to the Pennsylvania side
about a month before his unanticipated death. He died intes-
tate, and under West Virginia law, his wife would inherit the
entire estate. 206 Under Pennsylvania law, she would share the
estate with his surviving siblings. 20 7 The decedent was techni-
cally domiciled in Pennsylvania at the time of his death; 208
thus, the court held that Pennsylvania law applied.20 9 In Estate
of Jones, the decedent was between domiciles at the time of
death. He left his Iowa domicile and perished when a German
submarine sank the vessel on which he was sailing back to his
native Wales. The court held that he retained his Iowa domicile
until he acquired a new one,210 so that Iowa law determined
the succession to his estate.21 1
In both cases, the rigid application of the domiciliary rule
produced functionally unsound results. Although Hill does not
discuss these cases as such, they are examples of the situations
coming within his proposed exceptions to the application of the
domiciliary rule. White v. Tennant comes within the situation
204. 31 W. Va. 790, 8 S.E. 596 (1888).
205. 192 Iowa 78, 182 N.W. 227 (1921).
206. 31 W. Va. at 795, 8 S.E. at 598.
207. Id.
208. The case is used to illustrate the proposition that physical presence in the
state, no matter how brief, coupled with the intention to remain there indefinitely,
is sufficient to create a new domicile of choice.
209. 31 W. Va. at 797, 8 S.E. at 599.
210. The case is used to illustrate the proposition that a party retains the
party's former domicile, even if it has been abandoned, until the party has physically
reached the intended new domicile.
211. 192 Iowa at 95, 182 N.W. at 234.
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where "regulatory authority may be conferred upon a state having
only a tenuous connection with a person, to the exclusion of a
state having a more meaningful connection-and all without regard
to the nature of the particular issue before the court. ' 212 In the
typical situation, the application of the law of the domicile to
determine succession to property produces a functionally sound
result: the domicile has a real interest in applying its law to
determine succession to the domiciliary's property, and to the
extent that the decedent relied on any state's law in planning
succession, it would have been the law of the domicile. Here,
however, the court was presented with an atypical situation-the
decedent acquired a new domicile shortly before his unanticipated
death-and the factors that cause the domiciliary rule to produce
a functionally sound result in the typical situation will cause it to
produce a functionally unsound result in the atypical situation.
The decedent lived practically all of his life in West Virginia and
all of the claimants, including the widow, were domiciled in West
Virginia at the time of his death. If the decedent had consulted a
lawyer about his estate, it probably would have been a West
Virginia lawyer. Perhaps the reason that he never made a will was
that he was advised that, under West Virginia law, his widow
would get the entire estate. Clearly, West Virginia had a real
interest in applying its law to determine succession to the estate
of this decedent, and if the decedent had relied on any law at all,
it was West Virginia law. For all of these reasons, West Virginia
law should have determined succession to his estate. A presumptive
law of the domicile rule, as advocated by Hill, would permit this
result, while the traditional approach's rigid law of the domicile
rule would not.
Estate of Jones fits neatly, except for the time factor, into the
situation discussed by Hill where "the decedent had long ceased
to have any significant connection with the place of his domi-
cile. ' 213 At the time of his death, the decedent had left Iowa to
return to Wales, from which he had emigrated many years before
to avoid a paternity proceeding concerning a putative daughter,
who was now claiming a share in his estate. Under English law,
applicable in Wales, the putative daughter would not inherit any-
thing; the decedent's siblings, also Wales residents, would inherit
the estate. At the time of his death, Wales would seemingly have
212. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1631.
213. Id. at 1630.
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an interest in determining succession to his estate, while Iowa
would not. Thus, a functionally sound result in this case would
have been to refer to English law to determine succession to this
decedent's estate.
With respect to succession, the presumptive applicability of the
law of the decedent's domicile to determine succession to movable
property and land will ordinarily produce functionally sound re-
sults. A court should apply the law of the situs to determine
succession to land instead of the law of the domicile only in those
relatively few cases where the matter in issue involves a land
utilization policy of the situs. In cases like White v. Tenant and
Estate of Jones, a court can refer to the law of a state other than
the decedent's domicile when that state, and not the domiciliary
state, has a real interest in applying its law. Again, the difference
between an approach based on the presumptive validity of tradi-
tional rules, as advocated by Hill, and the rigid application of
those rules under the traditional approach, is the difference between
an approach that ensures functionally sound results and one that
does not.
Professor Hill does not discuss choice of law with respect to
trusts and future interests or marital property; however, the pre-
sumptive applicability of the traditional rules generally will produce
functionally sound results here. In regard to trusts and future
interests, the traditional rule is based on party autonomy, which
Professor Hill would endorse. The courts will generally recognize
an express choice of law and, in the absence of an express choice,
will apply the law of the state where the trust is being adminis-
tered. 21 4 The only exception to this rule is that the state of
administration will not recognize an express choice of law that
displaces the law of the domicile where the matter in issue involves
a very strong policy of the domicile, such as the right of the
surviving spouse to take against the will. 215
214. See AcRoss STATE LINEs, supra note 10, at 93-94. Usually the settlor will
choose the law of the state where an institutional trustee is administering the trust;
however, state courts where the trust is being administered will also recognize the
choice of the law of the settlor's domicile.
215. See Estate of Clark, 21 N.Y.2d 478, 236 N.E.2d 152, 288 N.Y.S.2d 993
(1968). The New York court refused to recognize an express choice of New York
law by the Virginia decedent, who had established a trust with a New York bank,
because the decedent's wife would not have been able to exercise her right to take
against the will under Virginia law. Id. at 487, 236 N.E.2d at 156, 288 N.Y.S.2d
at 999-1000.
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The traditional rule regarding marital property generally looks
to the law of the domicile to determine spousal rights. The char-
acter of movable property acquired by the married couple as
separate or community property is determined by the law of the
marital domicile at the time of acquisition, rather than by the law
of the situs.216 However, like the "split succession" rule, the
traditional rule looks to the law of the situs to determine the
character of land acquired by a married couple. Like the "split
succession" rule, this produces a functionally unsound result in
most cases. Absent an issue involving its land utilization policy,
the situs has no interest in applying its law to determine the
character of property acquired by non-residents. However, there
is some indication that the courts are now prepared to abandon
this part of the rule.217 What is more important as a practical
matter is that, in most cases, the law of the situs will not determine
the character of land acquired there by a non-resident spouse
because of the tracing rule. Under this rule, the use of marital
property to purchase other property does not affect marital prop-
erty rights. As a consequence, if a spouse domiciled in a common
law state uses his or her separate property to purchase land in a
community property state, the land retains its character as separate
property under the tracing rule.218
The tracing rule also applies where one spouse uses marital
property improperly. Under the rule, the law of the domicile
determines the other spouse's rights. However, the law of the situs
determines an innocent third party's rights in the sense that the
third party is entitled to rely on the law of the situs and is not
required to "search for" possible rights of the other spouse with
respect to that property. To illustrate, suppose that the spouses
are domiciled in State X, a community property state. One spouse
wrongfully takes community property and purchases land in State
Y from a resident of State Y. Assume that under State X law the
other spouse could petition to have the sale set aside. The sale is
valid under State Y law in the sense that, under State Y law, there
would be no constraints on the spouse's purchase of the land. As
216. See, e.g., Burton v. Burton, 23 Ariz. App. 159, 531 P.2d 204 (1975); In
re Crichton's Estate, 20 N.Y.2d 124, 228 N.E.2d 799, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1967).
217. See Williams v. Williams, 390 A.2d 4 (D.C. App. 1978). The court applied
the law of the situs to determine the spouse's interest in land for purposes of
divorce, but only because this was the last marital domicile in addition to the
husband's present domicile. Id. at 6.
218. See, e.g., Hughes v. Hughes, 91 N.M. 339, 573 P.2d 1194 (1978).
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between the innocent spouse and the innocent State Y seller, State
Y law applies and the sale is valid. However, as between the
spouses domiciled in state X, the funds will be traced and the land
will belong to the community rather than to the spouse in whose
name it was purchased. 219
In the area of property and succession, as has been demon-
strated, the presumptive applicability of the traditional rules-as
slightly modified here-will produce functionally sound results.
Therefore, it is in this area that Professors Hill's thesis has the
strongest empirical support and the most validity.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Alfred Hill has presented an important thesis about
the judicial function in conflicts cases and the significance of
precedent and continuity in choice of law. As part of his thesis,
Professor Hill maintains that the traditional choice of law rules,
when understood in terms of continuity and precedent, may provide
a valuable resource for the courts when resolving choice of law
questions. He attacks the modern "choice of law revolution" for
its seeming disregard of continuity and precedent and for what he
sees as "widespread judicial rejection" of the traditional rules and
the "substitution of ad hoc methods for the solution of choice of
law problems."220 He argues that courts should presumptively apply
the traditional rules to resolve the choice of law questions that
arise today and that the rules should be applied, except where
their application in a particular case would not produce a func-
tionally sound result.22'
In this Article, I have evaluated and responded to the propo-
sitions set forth in Professor Hill's thesis. I agree with Professor
Hill's propositions concerning the judicial function in conflicts
cases and the significance of precedent and continuity in choice of
law. However, I do not agree with his contention that the modern
"choice of law revolution" has brought with it the "substitution
of ad hoc methods for the solution of choice of law problems."m2
To the contrary, I maintain that the courts that have abandoned
the traditional approach to choice of law do apply judicial method
to the resolution of the choice of law issues that arise in practice
219. See AcRoss STATE LINus, supra note 10, at 96.
220. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1586.
221. See supra notes 3-24 and accompanying text.
222. Judicial Function, supra note 3, at 1586.
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today. I have demonstrated this proposition by an illustrative
discussion of the practice of courts in one state 23 and by a
discussion of the "rules of choice of law" that have emerged from
the decisions of the courts in conflicts torts cases. 224
I responded to the continuity part of Professor Hill's thesis by
discussing the utility of the traditional rules that he proposes in
the torts, contracts, and property and succession areas. I concluded
that the lex loci delicti rule has no utility in resolving the choice
of law issues that arise in conflicts torts cases and that its purported
application, even presumptively, distorts the analysis of the real
interests of the involved states and may lead to functionally
unsound results.3
In the contracts area, I concluded that Professor Hill's pro-
posed party autonomy rule is useful in determining questions of
construction and interpretation. Additionally, the rule applies to
questions that, although analytically go to validity, do not involve
a strong policy of the forum or state whose law would be applied
in the absence of party autonomy. Looking to the law "intended
by the parties" may be helpful in resolving any question of
"fundamental unfairness." However, most questions of validity
implicate a strong policy of the forum or other involved state, and
I rejected party autonomy as a means of determining the choice
of law issue, even presumptively, in these kinds of cases. 226
In the area of property and succession, I concluded that the
traditional rules produce functionally sound results in most appli-
cations. This is because, regardless of the conceptual premises of
the traditional rules, the rules usually serve to implement consid-
erations of policy and fairness in this area. I used the traditional
rules in this area to illustrate the difference between Professor
Hill's view that the traditional rules should be presumptively
applicable and the rigid applicability of the rules under the tradi-
tional approach to choice of law that courts followed in this
country. Thus, I believe that Professor Hill's thesis has the strong-
est empirical support and, thus, the most validity in this area.227
Professor Hill's thesis regarding the judicial function in con-
flicts cases and the significance of continuity and precedent in
choice of law is one with which I fully agree. Courts have preserved
223. See supra notes 66-103 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 110-60 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 161-90 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 191-219 and accompanying text.
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continuity and precedent by the application of judicial method to
the resolution of the conflicts cases that arise in practice. The only
difference between myself and Professor Hill in this regard is that
I see continuity and precedent today as beginning with the modern
"choice of law revolution." This "revolution" has been going on
for about a quarter-century, and the significance of continuity and
precedent in choice of law is not lessened by the break with much
of what has preceded the "revolution." At the same time, as we
have seen with the traditional rules in the property and succession
area, the valuable part of the past-the traditional rules that are
likely to produce functionally sound results in practice-has been
maintained. To this extent, modern choice of law is an amalgam
of "traditional and modern learning." Most importantly, this
amalgam is likely to lead to functionally sound results in practice
which, in the final analysis, is what choice of law is all about.
